By Awa Kalu, SAN
There can be no doubt that there are still with us ‘echoes of Biafra’ in the politics of today leading several people to ‘think’ or ‘imagine’ that militancy in any form may be valid in seeking redress for marginalization in all its manifestations. Again, having regard to the role of chiefs in lending their authority to the secession, is it any wonder that our leaders at all levels still consider them indispensable to the management of our affairs?

While it is impossible to analyse in any detail the legal and constitutional implications of secession in a Newspaper article, it would suffice for now to state that the declaration of secession led to a civil war and some matters or disputes which crystallized before or during the period of secession ended up in the law courts.

Thus, although the late Ikemba Nnewi was not a party to many of those disputes, the dimensions of such cases were resolved having regard to the legal regime at the time. For instance, the concept of ‘abandoned property’ arose as a result of the civil war.

Alhaji Hamza v. Godwin Ilochonwu (1976) 6 ECSLR 14 was one of such cases. The case concerned a developed parcel of land which the Plaintiff bought in 1940 and subsequently developed. He was in occupation of the property until 1967 when he was forced by events connected with the Nigerian civil war to abandon it.

When he returned to Onitsha in 1970 he found that his house on the land had been demolished and a story building put up in its place. The Defendant refused to yield up possession and the learned trial judge held that since the Plaintiff left in 1967 with an intention to return, he was entitled to an order for repossession of both the land and premises.

It has to be noted that not all cases relating to ‘abandoned property’ were so easily resolved. This was probably the most contentious fallouts from the civil war. There is a good number of other cases arising from facts which, as has been explained, were occasioned by the civil war.

For instance, Nwajukwu Emefisi & 2 others v. Michael Mbanugwu & 4 others (1970-71) 1 ECSLR 69 concerned a land dispute in which a sum of money in “Biafran” currency was deposited in the Treasury for payment to the party who won the case.

The court held the parties bound by the agreement and the Defendants could not be blamed for payment made in illegal currency. More profound is the decision of C.A. Oputa J., (as he was) in John Oduah II and Anor v. Onmeha Arubeze & others (1970-71) 1 ECSLR 185 in which His Lordship held that he had the jurisdiction to hear and determine an action which was commenced in the “High Court of Biafra” notwithstanding that he was sitting in the High Court of the East Central State.

In an illuminating dictum, His Lordship held that “During the civil war and in spite of the civil war it was necessary to maintain law and order even in the areas controlled by the illegal regime”. His Lordship pointed out that ‘it may be because of this that the Federal Military Government did not revoke the appointment of Judges of the former Eastern Region sitting within the rebel enclave.

In any event in the courts in the area controlled by the illegal regime it was Nigerian law that was administered. A distinction ought to be drawn between acts, even of an illegal regime, necessary for the preservation of peace and good order among citizens and acts which aid and foster the rebellion.

In Alinchi Alo & Anor v. Umanyi Chukwu & 7 Others (1973) 3 ECSLR (pt.11) 871, it was decided that the High Court of the East Central State was competent to hear and determine an appeal which was pending in the High Court of Eastern Nigeria, holden in Abakeliki, before the outbreak of the civil war in 1967, notwithstanding the purported hearing of the appeal in 1967 in the “High Court of the Republic of Biafra”.

The last case to which the reader’s attention may be drawn is Pius Nwaoga v. The State (1972) All NLR 153. The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of the appellant for the murder of an alleged rebel soldier living in territory controlled by Federal troops. The appellant, as narrated in the law report, and those with him, were officers in the rebel army who, disguised in civilian clothes, were operating during the civil war as saboteurs behind Federal lines.

Acting on the orders of his superior officers, the appellant knowingly identified the deceased, a former rebel soldier then living peacefully and unarmed within Federal-held territory, for the purpose of having him deliberately and intentionally killed by the others.

The Supreme Court held that a soldier operating within a belligerent’s territory disguised in civilian clothes is liable to punishment for any offence committed by him in violation of the domestic law of that territory. So, the appellant, who is guilty of an offence under the criminal code, is liable to punishment, just like any civilian would be, whether or not he acted under orders.

There are only two other issues related to Ojukwu’s acts and their consequences that would require a short consideration. The first is to remind ourselves that the late secessionist leader had been granted a pardon before his return from exile in the 80s by the President Shehu Shagari administration. Professor Nwabueze in his book earlier referred to, endorsed the view of the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Garland, 4, Wall 333, pp.380-1 to the effect that –

‘A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offence.

If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.’

Indeed, no penalties and disabilities attached to the late Ikemba Nnewi from the time he returned from exile until he died having regard to the grant of pardon.

The second issue relates to the niggling problems associated with national integration and the quest for unity which have remained elusive till date. A notable author usefully quoted by Nwabueze is of the view that: ‘The democratic problem in a plural society is to create political institution which give all the various groups the opportunity to participate in decision-making, since only thus can they feel that they are full members of a nation, respected by their more numerous brethren, and owing equal respect to the national bond which holds them together. In such a society a slogan that the will of the minority should prevail would make better sense than the slogan that the will of the majority should prevail; but neither slogan is appropriate.