INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru Jega’s comments on the Senior Staff Establishments Committee (SSEC) Report on the PWC Report. This is the concluding part of the memo the first part of which was published last Sunday)

INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru Jega’s comments on the Senior Staff Establishments Committee (SSEC) Report on the PWC Report. This is the concluding part of the memo the first part of which was published last Sunday Honorable National Commissioners, Secretary to the Commission, I have studied and reviewed the Report of the SSEC on the PWC Report titled Comprehensive Structural Review of the Commission and wish to comment as follows: …..

The essential point is, the Commission cannot be called a Board, even though Some of its regular meetings at the highest level are akin to those of what is normally called a Board; and the National Commissioners are not akin to “mere Board Members” given their enormous additional roles/responsibilities. However, they have no “executive” roles, as the SSEC implies in its use of the terms “management and control”

I don’t see the relevance of the reference to Section 159(i) I of the 1999 Constitution on Quorum. In all meetings of the Commission, whether the regular meeting of the Commission of Chairman and National Commissioners, or in the Standing Committees, Quorum has never been in contention. And, I don’t see how the constitutional provision on quorum of meetings helps to clarify the issue of whether or not National Commissioners are “executives”!

I humbly submit that, “the understanding of the Committee that all National Commissioners including the Chairman, are “Executive”, with the latter as being the Chief Executive”, is wrong, and has no basis in law or in existing practice, since the establishment of INEC. National Commisioners are National Commissioners; and the Chairman is Chairman and Chief Electoral Commissioner, as well as the Chief Executive, in law and in practice. Even more surprising is the laboured attempt to depict National Commissioners and the Chairman as equals. One wonders why drawing this award parallel should become a preoccupation of the SSEC. I shall retum to this later.

On whether accepting the proposed Organogram by PWC “translates into retrenchment of about 3,000 staff
This is not necessarily so; and I certainly feel strongly about and oppose retrenchment. But it is, however, wrong to conflate restructuring and reorganization with retrenchment. These can be done, and have been done by other organizations without retrenchment. There are many creative ways of handling the issue of what to do with staff following restructuring, including what the SSEC is proposing. I am glad that our Resource Person, Dr. Onugu pointed this out on Monday. In any case, we are to carefully examine and determine what to accept of the proposed Organogram, not to merely accept it hook line and sinker. As I mentioned earlier on, I believe we can do even better than they have proposed, if we want a trim, efficient and effective INEC.

On the recommendations of the SSEC
I strongly agree that “the Committee System, which has been used for decades by the Commission should continue to be the basis of its work”; indeed, a strong Committee System that serves as the clearing house of the work of the Commission.

The Commission presently has established Standing Committees, which are composed on thematic line. They should generally function in accordance with the letter and spirit of the legal provisions.

The pertinent question is: whether Standing Committees are only strong when they exercise executive functions and “manage and control” departments, directorates and units?

The answer is no.
First, it would be an unprecedented misnormer to place the day-to-day functioning of departments, etc., under the executive “management and control” of Standing Committees of the overall policy making body and/or their Chairmen. The laws do not provide so, INEC has never done so, and there is nowhere where it is so.

Second, for the avoidance of doubt, “A committee is a type of small deliberative assembly that is usually intended to remain subordinate to another, larger deliberative assembly” The key word here is “deliberative”; thus, Standing Committees deliberate on policies, strategies, oversightJsupervisory issues. They are not about policy execution or strategy implementation, or handling procurement; these are roles/responsibilities, which are traditionally handled by an executive organ of an entity, be it called an institution, agency or Commission. The import of this is that the Commission and by implication it’s committees, are a non-executive deliberative assembly. It may be inferred that the Committees by delegation of the . Commission are to provide policy, guidelines, regulations, \ strategy, oversight and supervision .

Third, the Electoral Act specifies in Part II, that: “There shall be a Secretary to the Commission who shall be appointed by the Commission”; “who shall be the head of the Commission’s Secretariat and be responsible for its administration”; and “who shall be responsible for the direction and control of all other employees of the Commission with the approval of the Commission” (emphasis mine)

Given these, it will be unconstitutional for the National Commissioners to exercise any “management and control” of any employee in the discharge of his day-to-day responsibilities in the Commission. All that the National Commissioners can do, in standing committees or in the committee-as-a-whole (i.e. Commission meetings) is “appoint” or otherwise “dismiss or exercise disciplinary control over … staff’ if/when they do not discharge their day-to-day responsibilities appropriately. It is interesting that in the so-called “management and control”

Organogram of the SSEC, there is no Secretary notwithstanding that the Electoral Act is clear on the responsibility of the Secretary to “direct and control” all other employees!

Clearly, in a laboured attempt to rationalize this clumsy situation, a second Organogram is created that includes the Secretary and in which staff report through the Secretary to the “Chairman and National Commissioners” and finally to the Commission, which consists of the Chairman and National Commisioners!

On the SSEC’s proposed Committees
It would have been better to focus on restructuring and reorganizing the administrative/executive organ of the Commission at this Retreat, without conflating Committees and their roles with these. We then would have considered taking time later to review the Standing Committee Structure of the Commission. Nonetheless, I have studied the proposed Committees and wish to comment as follows:

There is no need for establishing a Strategic Planning Committee as a Standing Committee. Strategic Planning is periodic (on a 4- or 5-year basis) and is conventionally handled by an adhoc committee with a given time-frame to conclude its assignment, like the one we recently appointed.

Committees are structured in such a way that they address issues thematically; thus they do not necessarily have to correspond with existing departments. It is the parallelling of the number of Standing Committees with that of departments that is problematic as it is ill-informed by the notion of Standing Committes having executive roles. As presently constituted, in any case, the Committees provide “a sense of belonging for the whole country” as every National Commissioner chairs one (1) Committee.

A major challenge that needs to be addressed is that the way our Tenders Board is presently constituted is inconsistent with the provisions of the Procurement Act. Nobody would contest the need to ensure full compliance with the Procurement Act and all laws for that matter. I would give this the highest priority.

With the reorganization of the Electoral Institute, perhaps a new Committee, addressing Voter Education, Gender and Civil Society thematic issues, need to be created.

Given our regular high levels of procurement and the need to constantly decongest our stores, it is necessary to retain the Board of Survey and Technical Committee on Equipment Acquisition (BOSTAC)

Additionally, I believe that as soon as possible we need to review appropriately the handbook titled Terms of Reference of the Standing Committees to make it consistent with existing laws and regulations

On the proposed Organogram by SSEC

It is a misnormer to place the the Chairman and Chief Electoral 0fficer on the same level of executive responsibilities or “management and control” in an Organogram with the National Commissioners. The legally defined responsibilities and job descriptions (and even remunerations!) are not the same. This is taking the notion of “first among equals” to a ridiculous extreme. It should be noted that in an Organigram, rationally, the National Electoral Commissioners are above the Secretary but below the Chairman, the Chairman being the Chief Electoral Officer.

Departments/Directorates/Units cannot be subsumed under the “management and control” of Standing Committees. Departments, etc., which are functional executive groupings of employees, report by law, to the Secretary and the Chief Executive in their routine day-to-day activities.

The Standing Committees can and should, be very strong and effective in the Commission, by concentrating on their core responsibilities of creating guidelines, policy and regulations on the specific thematic issues they are set up to address, and in supervisory and internal oversighl roles on departments. Committees cannot be simultaneously involved in executve: capacities. If I may ask: where and how is the supervisory of Commissioners exercise over states to be reflected in the “management and control” side of the Commission?

We do not, and cannot, create a “sense of national belonging” by giving committees illegal charge of departments. If for example, we had only 6 Committees and have 1 chairfrom each geopolitical zone we would also have created national inclusiveness, although I am not at all suggesting that we reduce the number of Committees to 6.

The proposed Appointments, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee (APDC) should be separated into: 1). Appoints and Promotion Committee, APC for short (to replace the nomenclature of SSEC) and 2) Welfare and disciplinary Committee, WDC, for short (to replace the nomenclature of the SSW&DC) in line with good practice nationally.

On Standing Committees of the Commission Generally

The Secretary, a head of the Commission’s Secretariat, should provide the Secretariat for each Standing Committee. The directors of corresponding Departments need not be secretaries of the Committees, although they should be in attendance at meetings of Committees whose themes cover their departments. The Committee Secretary will take regular minutes of the proceedings of each Committee and ensure that proper records of these are maintained in the Commission Secretariat. Submissions from the Committee to Commission meetings should be prepared by the Secretary to the Committee under the supervision of the Chairman of the Committee, who as has been the case, would present to the Commission meeting.

On the proposed Salary Structure
The recommendations of the PWC, and those by SSEC, are useful starting points but we need to compute the total cost implications, something that hasn’t been done by PWC, before deciding on which option to take. It may become necessary to develop a hybreed of these?

Recommendations
Arising from my review of and comments on the SSEC Report on PWC Report, I wish to recommend as follows:
1.At this Retreat we should not conflate the issues of restructuring and reorganization of the adminstrative structure of INEC and those of making National Commissioners as Executives. If we have to do the latter at all, the best forum might be in our interactions with the members of the National Assembly as they undertake the review of the Constitution and the Electoral Act. We may then wish to ask them to make explicit provisions in the laws as to who is the Accounting Officer of INEC, whether National Commissioners are also Executives, and so on.

2.Let us then review the recommendation of the PWC, those of the SSEC and mine and see what kind of trim structure we may come up with, to reduce over departmentalization and sectionalization; to remove duplication of functions and responsibilities; and to make for efficient and effective service delivery of lNEC’s programmes and projects even before the Constitution and the Electoral Act are further amended.

Thank you.

Professor Attahiru M. Jega, OFR, Chairman, INEC
13/06/2012.