Continued from last week
At pages 1459 – 1460 of the record the court below (Coram: Olotu, J) found as a fact that:
The plaintiffs have shown vide affidavit evidence and Exhibits ‘KT 2 A-J and KT 3A – J that they are the candidates whose scores were declared and were returned by the 1st defendant on 9th/10th and 14th April, 2011 respectively in connection with the National Assembly elections which held on 9th April, 2011 … – The plaintiffs Exhibits KT 2A – J and KT 3A – J stand as proof for the plaintiffs as the candidates whose scores were declared and who were returned by the 1st Defendant at the election.

These are conclusive findings of fact, are not being contested by the parties, particularly INEC, the 1st defendant at the court below. The settled principle of law is that decisions of court not appealed against remain valid, binding, subsisting and presumed acceptable between the parties. See LSBPC v. PURIFIATION TECHNIQUES (NIG) LTD. (2012) 52 NSCQU (pt. 10 274 at 301 D-E.

Paragraph 33 of the counter-affidavit of 5th – 15th defendants admit that the Court of Appeal is the final court as regards appeals from National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal. This is an acknowledgment of Section 246 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.
Section 285 (1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, vests in the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction “to hear and determine petitions as to whether any person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly.”

The facts of this case suggest that INEC, the 1st defendant, conducted the election and declared each of the 1st – 10th respondents winner in their respective constituencies. INEC made the return after the conducting elections in those constituencies, which elections have not been nullified or invalidated. For each return, it issued a certificate of return to each of the 1st – 10th respondents. Thereafter INEC recanted, and purportedly withdrew the certificates of return issued to 1st – 10th respondents, and issued to the appellants, each, a new certificate or return.
I had set out the facts in which the 1st – 10th respondents, as plaintiffs took out the originating summons; the essence of which is a judicial review of the powers of INEC, and the 12th – 14th respondents in this appeal.
The law is settled that it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the trial court. See Emeka v. Okadigbo (2012) 18 NWLR (pt.1331) 55 at 89 & 101; Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 6-10 SC 31; Anya v. Iyayi (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.305) 290; Anigboro v. Sea Trucks Nig Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (pt.399) 35; Onuorah v. Okeke (2005) 10 NWLR (pt.932) 40.

I have read the claims of the plaintiffs and 1st-10th respondents and the facts on which the questions posed and the reliefs sought are predicated. I had earlier set them out in this judgment. I think, here, a distinction should be made between judicial review of administrative actions, which by dint of Section 6 (6) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, generally falls within inherent jurisdiction of court of law, and “the jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions as to whether any person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly,” which jurisdiction falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal by dint of Section 285 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.

Judicial review is a central mechanism of administrative law or public law, by which the judiciary historically took constitutional responsibility of protecting against abuses of power by public authorities. It ensures that not only that no public body or authority is above the law, but also the protection of the rights of all those affected by governmental actions. The courts insist that they have a constitutional role and duty of ensuring that the rights of citizens are not abused by unlawful exercise of executive power. Lord Diplock had stated in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service (1985) AC 374 at 408E that “judicial review–provides the means by which judicial control of administrative action is exercised.” The basis of judicial review rests in the free-standing principle that every action of a public body must be justified by law. See R (Beeson) v. Dorset County Council (2003) UKHRR 353. And that public officials or authorities must be governed by law and by law alone their actions be guided.