By Emeka Izuwah

With the recent upsurge in terror attacks comes the need to reconsider building design considerations to safe guard lives and property and minimise risk and probability of attack.

The ease at which security was beaten at the United Nations building in Abuja raises new questions as to the appropriateness of the entire complex in view of its status. Granted the building exhibited resilient structural integrity in withstanding impact, it ought to be more difficult to evade security.

The bombing at Lois Edet House -Nigeria’s Police Headquarters was also an indication that today’s design security considerations are clearly inadequate. The following anti-terror building design considerations are recommended for complexes that can be targets for terror attacks.

UN-Abuja-building-before-the bomb blast

* Single entry and exit point with CCTV coverage:

To maximise the use of security apparatus and for thoroughness of search, a single entry and exit situation is preferred. There is often a slackness at the exit point, a factor exploited maximally by the suicide bombers at the UN Building at Abuja. This entry point should be very well equipped with metal detectors, body scanners and other intruder detection gadgets.

*Separate visitors and staff parking:

While staff and service vehicle should park within the premises of their complex, it is now obviously a security risk for visitors to enter the premises of such organisations as a bomb can be hidden in a car boot and detonated remotely with a cell phone. This may have prevented the Abuja Police HQ bombing.

* Elevated entrance level:

It is amazing to observe that the Abuja UN suicide bomber was able to drive his car right into reception lobby of the complex hence the severe loss of lives and damage to property.

An elevated entrance situation could have prevented that dare-devil intrusion. The ramp which serves physically challenged guests should be positioned away from the driveway to prevent usage as passage into the building.

* Sharp shooter positioning:

In complexes with very high vulnerability to terror-attacks, provision may be made for sharp shooters who may respond where conventional preventive measures fail. This saved the state Police HQ at Maidugiri from a bomb attack.

* Choice of building materials:

Not all casualties of the Abuja UN bombing were as a direct result of the bombing some sustained injuries from broken glasses and suspended ceilings. While the use of these materials cannot be totally avoided, Architects must minimise the use of combustible or inflammable materials in complexes with likelihood of attack.

* Introduction of panic rooms:

These are specially designated and prepared rooms built to withstand high impact and are assembly points in the case of emergency.

These are the highpoint for anti-terror design considerations and just as buildings and building materials are fire-rated, we may now need to rate a building’s compliance to security and anti-terrorism. To be fore-warned is to be fore-armed!

•Emeka Izuwah is a Lagos-based Architect