COMPARISONS between Boko Haram and the militants in the Niger Delta, as the explanation for the proposed talks between government and the group in Maiduguri are inevitable, though many would refuse to see the connection.

Both groups rose against the state. Both refuse submission to the laws of the country. Governments sent security forces after them, only to realise that the issues were political  and could benefit more from negotiations than only force.

How it would work with Boko Haram is a major challenge. With the Niger Delta, government was the one giving the conditions, the major one being a deadline for militants to disarm, after which they would be re-habilitated. Those who refused to turn in their arms were deemed to have rejected the amnesty.

The economic interest that was the fulcrum of the Niger Delta amnesty is completely absent in Maiduguri and Bauchi where Boko Haram has made its bases. Outside a desire to have peace in those parts of the country, government’s interests is not deep enough, a point we made in the days of the fights in the Niger Delta.

Dangers abound in the way we tackle these challenges. The absence of strategic thinking in handling security matters means that when they arise we would approach them in ad hoc ways. Boko Haram is another example of how unprepared we are for challenges. Can we change? When will we change?

Boko Haram is clear in its demands. It wants an Islamic state, ejection of the current elected Borno State government, Islamic law and forbids association with western education. How would government negotiate with a group that has fundamental differences that are constitutional as well as religious? On the surface, it is impossible.

Leaders of the North have wavered over Boko Haram, seeing the security efforts in the areas as attacks on the region rather than a containment of the threats to the country from a critical zone that has boundaries with two unstable countries Chad and Niger.

Threats have not worked. The activities of security forces in the area have suffered from poor public relations. Boko Haram was ahead on criticising the activities of the security agencies. We saw a bit of that in the Niger Delta, where government was so insensitive, its eyes only on securing the oil wells, that it ignored any suggestions of brutality against the people.

Negotiation must be the only way left. Boko Haram operates from a podium of righteousness, not just a just cause. Its religious inclination is a cause that defies material appeasement. Religion is not always about logic. When you contest peoples’ religious positions, they see you as an unbeliever, one doomed for eternity and the case is made not to talk with unbelievers who will not understand the issues of belief.

Will the negotiations include abolition of education in Bauchi and Borno, which already have low rankings in this area? Will the sect be allowed to continue the religious purification of Northern Nigeria under the guise of a better brand of Islam? The issues will be touchy wherever they go.

Precedents are important, more important than we assume. If there were no amnesty in Niger Delta, with all the compromises, Boko Haram would have been handled differently, like Maitatsine, as we earlier suggested.

These precedents would continue to count against us. One day, we may see our governments negotiating with armed robbers, murderers, arsonists, and other bands of criminals, whose stake to lawlessness would be that we have governments that cannot maintain law and order and easily find enough justifications for their weakness.