By Edlyne Anugwom

RECENTLY, a politician who was schemed out or not elected as the presidential candidate of a prominent political party in the country blamed his fate on the influence of primordial factors in the political process. While his claims in this case seem vitiated by the fact that he performed even abysmally in his own zone, there is still no doubting the reality of primordial forces and the marginalisation effects these produce not only among the politicians but more commonly among citizens in Nigeria. However, a good starting point in this essay would be to examine what exactly is meant or conjured up by the notion of marginalisation. Without doubt marginalisation has become a powerful and emotive language in Nigeria’s political space, especially since the return of democracy in 1999.

In its clear and articulate form, marginalisation has been used in capturing the unfair treatment of socio-ethnic groups within a heterogenous or federal state, especially in the resource distribution process. As a result, marginalisation is deployed as a comparative tool; that is: a comparative and evaluative scheme that positions the treatment or share of a social or ethnic group in the context of those of other equal and coordinate groups. In Nigeria, it has been used to capture the perception by a group that in comparison to another or other groups it has been unfairly treated, short-changed, or even cheated in the process of economic and political resources distribution or allocation.

The above suggests that marginalisation is both consciously and systematically enthroned and unwittingly serves an out-group. While one can clearly understand the notion of marginalisation, especially in terms of its comparative nature, it is instructive to point out that the idea of marginalisation has been overtly politicised in Nigeria. In this sense, it has been used to capture real cases of marginalisation: apparent marginalisation and claimant marginalisation (used craftily to protect the advantage of a privileged group). For instance, one can go from the obvious marginalisation of the Niger Delta region (in terms of access to oil wealth derived from there); apparent marginalisation of the South-Eastern zone (in terms of systematic denial of access to prime political offices at the centre); to the cases of apparent marginalisation that may be as a result of inherent group marginality (incapacity) to outright baseless claims of marginalisation (strategically employed to protect or promote the interests of an already advantaged group) where there is none.

From the above, it behoves on us to critically apply marginalisation in capturing systematic exclusion, unfair treatment, or subjugation of a group within a heterogenous society like Nigeria. In this situation, marginalisation should be used strictly to comprehend the deliberate disempowerment of a socio-ethnic group in a federation whether in terms of access to political offices, fiscal allocation processes, command of the military, leadership of bureaucracies by another group or other groups that are wielders of power and authority at the centre. It thus goes without saying that the above distinctions should guide us in analysing the reality or otherwise of marginalisation claims in the political space in modern Nigeria. In other words, while there may be claims and counterclaims of marginalisation, the onus lies on the discerning public- and public-spirited politicians and policy makers to tease out genuine claims that can be legitimately or directly related to extant power relations and distribution of resources.

Without doubt, while it is a no-brainer to comprehend and even structurally locate the basis of marginalisation claims of the peoples of the Niger Delta region in present Nigeria, the same claim by other regions or parts of the country can always appear tenuous, especially in a democratic context where access to power and resources are ostensibly mediated by partisan politics and associations cutting across ethnic and regional divides. It is on the basis of the above that the case for a president of South-Eastern extraction in present Nigeria is often conflated with a nebulous notion of the South, which in reality has meant the West. But more important, is that the agitation for such a president can be seen (and within certain degree of justification) as torpedoed by the pattern of politics and political association of mainstream politicians in the zone. This reality is further reinforced (mainly for the sake of argument) by the logic that power is not simply thrust on someone. In other words, you must work assiduously for it. An unfortunate truism in Nigeria where our nominal democracy and role of money and primordial allegiances erode all conventional norms of representative democracy.

However one looks at it, ranging from the shameless argument that rotation of power coheres with the Constitution and is anchored on the colonial Northern and Southern protectorates (the ideas of one of the TV politicians and philosophers that make watching TV programmes in Nigeria tortuous) to the ridiculous notion that the South for all purposes can be represented by only one zone therein, the political situation has privileged marginalisation. Even the Constitution, which is wrongly referenced in adducing federal character by political jingoists, captures the idea of regions and ethnic groups. Beyond the cries of marginalisation and the fractional solidarity it produces, perception of marginalisation promotes asymmetrical relations and engenders social inequality. Incidentally, marginalisation erodes the capacity of groups to question or change the state of things within the prevailing state structure. Therefore, marginalisation does not just cheat and treat unfairly but equally suggests the incapacity of the marginalised group to confront the status quo or meaningfully work towards change. It emerges as a tool for not only keeping a group in a disadvantaged position but also in perpetuating that position. This is the critical juncture at which the South-East zone has found itself in relation to the prevailing situation in the two major or dominant political parties in Nigeria.

The apparent hopelessness of the above situation for both the South-East zone and the Niger Delta region may sponsor the feeling that social conflict, insurgence and organised dissension as one has seen recently are attractive options towards redressing inequity or agitating for the right thing to be done. However, these phenomena (radical dissension and conflicts) undermine democracy and may foster social and political atmospheres that erode development and growth in general. But the Nigerian state as it is currently structured and governed may be seen as producing unmet aspirations for a generality of its citizens despite their different socio-spatial and ethnic locations.

Prof. Anugwom is of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nigeria Nsukka.