Continued from last week

By Prince Philips Adu-Odogwu Esq.

If the unlikely event or hypothetical situation of the State High Court having been abolished by the Military Government, would the abolished court have been resurrected because the appellant had instituted an action the cause of action which arose when that court was still in existence? The answer is of course in the negative. It is essential to differentiate the application of the law when cause of action arose and the jurisdiction exercisable by the court when the proponent of an action decided to institute an action”.

I also said in my concurring judgment at page 650

“ the principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law   existing at the time the cause of action arose, cannot be invoked to vest jurisdiction in a court that lacks it. If a court lacks jurisdiction in a matter, no amendment of law can vest jurisdiction on it. In the case under reference, UWAIFO, JSC called in aid the decision of the supreme court in CHIEF UTIH V. ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 NWLR (PT. 166), WHERE BELLO, CJN; held that the relevant law applicable in respect of a cause of action or matter is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose in the case of the law relating to jurisdiction when the action was instituted.

Learned counsel for the appellant would appear to have used cause of action and jurisdiction as interchangeable terms in this appeal that explains why he took the definition of an action in great details in issue No. 1at pages 6 to 10 of his brief. The principle of law that the relevant law applicable in respect of a cause or matter is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose can only be extended to the purview of jurisdiction if at the same time the court had jurisdiction in the matter.

In other words, the principle can only apply if the jurisdiction of the court coincides with the law in force at the time the cause of action arose which vested the court with jurisdiction”. I can still fall back on CHIEF UITH V ONOYINVW (SUPRA) WHERE BELLO, CJN, said at page 201. The cause of action in this case on appeal may be said to have arisen from 7th June, 1977, when the 1st Defendant was appointed as the Ovie of Evwreni. As shown earlier, the claim was filed on 18th July, 1978. It follows therefore the applicable laws in force on 18th July, 1978, to wit, section 161(3) and 161(1) of the 1963 constitution and section 36 of the chiefs law which have been set out in this judgment.”

“Let me apply the above principle to the raw figures in this matter by way of dates as done by Bello, CJN. It is common ground that the cause of action arose in October, 1989, and the appellant filed the action on13th January,1993. The Decree which vested in the Federal High Court the jurisdiction to entertain the matter in this appeal came into effect on 17th November, 1993.

Although the action was properly filed at the Kwara State High Court in 17th January, 1993, that court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter as from 17th November, 1993 when Decree No. 107 was promulgated. Accordingly the Kwara State High Court had no jurisdiction to deliver judgment. The judgment which the court delivered on 18th May, 1996 some thirty months after the ceaser of its jurisdiction is a nullity ab initio.”

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the law four years after in the case of OSAKWE V F.C.E ASABA & 2 ORS (SUPRA).

As stated above, is that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the following:

The Plaintiff’s claim

Statutes

On 1 above, jurisdiction is determined from the claim as formulated by the Plaintiff. The subject matter of a suit is found on the claims not on the parties to the litigation.

Secondly, every court is a product of a statute. And every statue that creates a court assigns to it, its scope of duties or responsibilities. Again jurisdiction could also be referred to as the venue where litigant can be heard for their claim. This is why sometime an action may be properly before a court, but before the conclusion of it a new law may emerge thereby taking away the venue from the court even though the causes of action may still stand. See section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and   section 254C(1) of the Third Alteration Act to the 1999 constitution which have taken away a great deal of the Federal and State High Courts jurisdiction and placed such in the Industrial Court.

By the provision of S. 254C (1) of the Third Alteration Act to the 1999 constitution, all matters relating to employment and other matters thereto pending at the Federal and States High Court   are divested of jurisdiction in such matters by the enactment of the Act. What it simply then means is that, the venue of the trial has changed from the Federal or State High Court to the Industrial Court, now saddled with the exclusive responsibility to adjudicate on matters of that nature, as provided in the Third Alteration Act to the 1999 Constitution.

Jurisdiction therefore is distinct from cause of action. The two should not be mixed.