Continues from last week

However, in Ugwu v.Ararume, the Supreme Court in interpreting Section 34(2) of the Electoral Act, held that a political party shall give cogent and verifiable reasons before a candidate can be changed. The outcome of this case turned upon the provision of Section 34(2), which requires a political party to give cogent and verifiable reason before dropping a candidate. Section 34(2) was not present in Onuoha and Dalhatu cases.

In these case, the Supreme Court applied the literal rule A similar conclusion was arrived at by the Supreme Court in Amaechi v.INEC, where the court held that the substitution of Amaechi for Omehia by the Peoples Democratic Party was unlawful since the PDP had not given cogent and verifiable reason for the substitution.

The Need for a Purposive Approach.

The interpretation and construction of statutes have undergone significant change in the commonwealth in recent times.  Criticising the over rigid adherence to the literal rule, Burrows submit that:

A modern state which runs on the machinery of legislation could not function effectively in an atmosphere of  non-co-operation between courts and legislature….

In the course of the twentieth century there has been a gradual change in approach, although even in relatively recent times there are clear traces of the old over-literal approach.

The purposive approach allows words to be stretched a little so that the objectives of the legislature can be achieved.  It is this approach that the Supreme Court had adopted in the recent cases referred to above. This is the Supreme Court doctrine  It is our view that the Supreme Court in Awolowo v. Shagari adopted this apoproach.

The over-rigid application of the literal rule of interpretation in many instances produces an unjust result which also does not conform with the intention of the legislature.  It must however be pointed out that a line must continue to be drawn between what the legislature wanted and what the court itself wants: one of the obvious dangers of the purposive approach is the potential for the blurring of these two things.

This article has also shown that there are in fact two rules of the interpretation of statutes: the literal rule and the others.  The golden and mischief rules are in fact good examples of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation.  This approach has gained widespread acceptance in the commonwealth and it is our view that it is well suited for adoption by our courts.

In the tenure elongation case, the governors of the five states listed above filed a case against the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) after their states were listed for election in April 2011 by the electoral body.

Theses governors were initially elected in 2007 and sometimes in 2008, their elections were nullified by the Court of Appeal. Fresh elections were ordered and the governors were re elected.They argued that by the provisions of  section 180(2) of the 1999 Constitution, their four years tenure commenced in 2008 when they took fresh oath of allegiance and of office. They insisted that with the nullification of their first election, their stay in office prior to the re-run elections amounted to a nullity in law.

Their cases were consolidated and the Federal High Court, Abuja gave judgment in their favour. On appeal by INEC to the Court of Appeal, the decision of the Federal High Court was upheld. The Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal were of the view that while the actions of the governors during the period prior to the nullification of  their elections, are valid and legal, the same period cannot be taken into account in calculating the tenure of the said governors following the nullification of their election.

In a landmark judgment delivered by the Supreme Court on the 27th of January, 2012, the Supreme Court over ruled the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The court held that in interpreting a statute or Constitution, the object is to discover the intention of the legislature and that such intention was usually deduced from the language used. The Court said:

From the language used in section 180 of the 1999 Constitution, it is very clear that the Constitution intended.

That a governor of a state shall have a tenure of four years  from the date he took the oath of  allegiance and of office and nothing more……In all, a governor has a maximum tenure of eight (8) years under the 1999 Constitution.