Biafra ended in January 1970. That is 41 years ago. But the temptation to draw public attention to a striking similarity it shares with today’s Nigeria is irresistible.

Biafra was a free bombing site, for the simple reason that it did not have an effective air defence system to thwart the raids of the Nigeria Air Force and its mercenary-dominated fighter-bomber pilots. The results were predictably catastrophic.

The free-bombing site status which Biafra epitomized was understandable. It lived for only two and a half years, most of which period was taken up by the pressures of firefights in the trenches, and the spectre of mass starvation, not to talk of the secessionist republic’s disadvantage in having London, Moscow and Washington DC viscerally antipathetic to its raison d’etre.

In the dire circumstances, the acquisition of deterrent weaponry like SAMs ( surface to air missiles) and Triple As (or anti-aircraft artillery) was a luxury beyond its affordance. Thus it just got repeatedly and remorselessly raped like a hapless whore whose thighs lay thrown asunder by feet tied to stakes wide apart.

The cost was grotesque: On September 18, 1968, the Otuocha Market in Aguleri was bombed. Death toll: 510. On February 7, 1969, the Afor Market in Umuohiagu, near Owerri, was bombed. Death toll: 312. On February 26, 1969, the Ozu-Abam Market near Ohafia was bombed. Death toll: 250.

In contradistinction to Biafra, the current enjoyment by Nigeria of a free-bombing site status, 51 years after its independence, sticks in the throat. It is untenable. It means that the country is scarcely proactive in security matters, which is utterly shameful and wholly indefensible. This sorry state of affairs explains the freedom with which the terrorists are sowing death and destruction even in the most unlikely places. However, the object of this piece is not the deployment of condemnatory adjectives. It is to place in the public square humble suggestions aimed at contributing to the efforts for defeating what will, otherwise, become pandemic to the crippling of everyone, the perpetrators of the dastardly crimes included.

The main instrument for fighting terrorism is intelligence. Counter-terrorism calls for advanced electronic and other methods of gathering, collating and analyzing information. Terrorists against countries like Britain, Israel and the United States go to great lengths to operate by stealth, knowing that they are tracked by sophisticated operators and equipment every second of each day. In Nigeria the criminals’ modus operandi is characterised by impunity. In societies with comprehensive intelligence credentials, terrorists are more often than not thwarted before they strike; invariably the criminals get ended or apprehended for their atrocious intentions and actions.

Not the tube, not the train, not the bus – there is hardly any means of public transportation in Britain today that is not equipped with electronic surveillance. It is difficult to walk on any of the country’s streets, or enter a supermarket or an office building without cameras recording such movements. Ubiquitous surveillance equipment helped Britain to roundup most of the criminals involved in the recent orgy of arson, destruction and looting.

In Nigeria the CCTV is a luxury. Fingerprinting is a luxury. Electronic surveillance is a luxury. Yet everyone knows that extremity of luxury only seals a people’s doom. What to do? To start from the very beginning, a country in Nigeria’s security predicament needs to urgently define the arrowhead of its counter-terrorism operations. A counter-terrorism Tsar is required. It must also be clear which arm of the security agencies is at the cutting edge of the anti-terrorist Intelligence operations. This will obviate situations like the recent one in which the Army and the Police went contradicting each other on seized dynamites meant for rock blasting. At a time Britain had to decide which of the Police and the MI5 was running the war against the terrorism generated by the Northern Ireland troubles. This didn’t mean that any security arm was redundant. There always are bodies for joint security coordination.

As these are sorted out, the country must quickly enter into specific, specialised and immediate cooperation agreements and arrangements with countries like the three already mentioned. International cooperation is a critical element in anti-terrorist operations, and Nigeria needs to learn from the titans.

Now, more on electronic surveillance. If Nigeria heightens its capability in this department, it will immediately move away from the damning status of a free-bombing site. There is no text message that is ever deleted. There is no fax message not permanently stored. There is no internet communication incapable of retrieval. Thus, the inspirers and financiers of terrorism can be guessed through obtaining from his service providers the comprehensive phone and text traffic on the mobile phones of suspected, captured or ended terrorists. Such data assists in determining those to be thrown into the circle of monitoring and surveillance. All it requires is for the country to dictate terms of operations to, and enter into watertight agreements with, the providers of communication services.

Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, recently interviewed by CNN’s Piers Morgan, mentioned that, while he was in office, Britain’s Intelligence services had under surveillance at any point in time some 2000 people who had al Queda and Taliban links. No country achieved this stupendous feat without sophisticated electronic surveillance and monitoring systems. The point is that no country can or will ever claim to have plugged all loopholes against terrorist attacks. What they achieve by being proactive and scientifically sophisticated is to drastically limit the likelihood of terrorist triumphs. What other cases of international terrorism have been reported in the US since 9-11 (September 11, 2001), or in the UK since 7-7 (July 7, 2005)? But, in Nigeria, the terrorists are operating with the regularity of twinkling eyes.

To thwart them, the additional aspect of adequate human capital is vital. Those who should know keep warning that the National Intelligence Agency, NIA, the State Security Service, SSS, the Police, the Customs, the Immigration and the Civil Defence Corps are all severely understaffed.

A country swamped by terrorists has no business with personnel shortfalls. Yet, there is the more critical variety of security personnel – the deep cover type. You see a bank manager, always in suit, mostly in his office, seriously engaged in banking. But his primary function is in deep cover intelligence.

Mr  Chuks Iloegbunam, a commentator on national issues, wrote from Lagos.