By Ladipo Adamolekun

Preamble

The ongoing debate on local governments in the country could end in a cul de sac if the crucial dimensions of the subject are not explicated and addressed. The trigger for the current debate is the directive of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) that, effective from June 1st, all funds from the Federation Account allocated to the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) be credited directly into each LGA’s account. According to reports in newspapers, NFIU’s intervention seeks to put a stop to the widespread practice of State governments hi-jacking the funds allocated to LGAs from the centre through the States Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) that they control.  And blatant stealing of LGA funds in a few cases have also been reported.

Ladipo Adamolekun

Given the problem that has been highlighted, the intervention of NFIU appears sensible.  However, as pointed out in some newspaper editorials on the subject and in the statement of the Nigeria Governors’ Forum (NGF) on May 19th, the directive is inconsistent with some provisions of the 1999 Constitution as amended.  Furthermore, some commentators have broadened the debate to include issues relating to local governments in Nigeria’s federal democracy that have featured in discussions on constitutional amendments and in national political conferences since 2000.

I am of the considered opinion that NFIU’s planned intervention should be put on hold and all key stakeholders should seize this opportunity to achieve a national consensus on local governments that are appropriate in Nigeria’s federal democracy. Before proceeding to proffer suggestions on desirable contents of the emergent consensus, I will provide as background an overview of the evolution of LGs from 1976 to 1999 and developments from 1999 to date.

Background

The bold and innovative 1976 Local Government reform was one of the rare measures of good governance during the decades of military misrule. Many opinion leaders in the country (including the writer) praised the reform when it was introduced partly because of the promise that it would be the first step towards the return to democratic civilian rule and partly because of its emphasis on the promotion of rapid socio-economic development at the local level.

Obviously, the promise of the 1976 LG reform mentioned above was the reason for enshrining provisions that were considered essential for maintaining its essential features in the 1979 Constitution.  But no attention was paid to the incongruity of maintaining local governments that were consistent with a unitary military government for the succeeding governments expected to operate within a federal democracy where federal and state governments could be controlled by different political parties whose views on local governments could diverge in significant respects.

LG Funds: Pro-democracy group charges Buhari to probe governors from 1999

This inconsistency was the major explanation for the confused and convoluted attempts of state governments to reform local governments during the civilian interlude from 1979 to 1983. When the military returned to power under General Buhari after only forty months of civilian rule, the Committee on the Review of Local Government Administration in Nigeria that he constituted in 1984 made recommendations that sought to improve the functioning of LGs within the framework of the restored unitary military government. (This is a first-hand assertion because I served in that Committee).

However, during the fifteen years of military rule that followed (that is, up to 1999), the changes to the 1976 LG reform undermined both its democratic and developmental orientations. For the most part, LGs became instruments of control in the hands of state-level military governors/administrators.  Furthermore, successive federal military leadership groups increased the number of local governments from 301 in 1985 to 774 by 1999, ostensibly in response to popular demands. In reality, there was always not-so-hidden geo-political arithmetic in the creation of new local governments. The result is a skewed distribution of the current 774 LGs among states and geopolitical zones.

Next, during two decades of uninterrupted civilian rule (1999-2019), the fundamental contradictions in LGs inspired by successive unitary military governments over three decades emerged very clearly. However, president Obasanjo who ruled during the first eight years (1999-2007) only exacerbated the contradictions because his military culture made him comfortable with the inherited features of LGs.  (He was a military ruler from 1976 to 1979). Available evidence included the following: (i) he sought to enforce primacy for the central government in the creation of new local governments by seizing funds due to LGs in Lagos State because the state government had created 37 Local Development Area Councils (LCDAs); (ii) he championed the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local Governments Act 2005 that vested the authority in the Auditor General of the Federation; (iii) he expanded the role of the federal government in primary education from prescribing minimum standards (as stated in the 1999 Constitution) to include federal participation in primary education through the Universal Basic Education (UBE) Act that he championed; (iv) under his watch, the FG deducted from LGs’ funds at source to fund the buying of jeeps for the Police; and (v) in the twilight of his 8-year rule, the Federal Government (FG) awarded contracts for the building of one primary health clinic in each of the 774 LGs without consultation with either the state or local governments. (Mercifully, his successor, Umaru Yar’Adua, terminated the contracts on the grounds that states and local governments had not been consulted).

Lagos State successfully challenged Obasanjo’s authoritarianism at the Supreme Court in 2004: the court affirmed the primacy of state governments in creating new local governments but added that the 1999 Constitution requires the law passed by a State House of Assembly (HA) to be passed by the National Assembly (NASS). Furthermore, some like-minded states succeeded in getting the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local Governments Act abrogated by the apex court in 2006 on the ground that the Act amounted to encroachment on state autonomy.  Another notable intervention of the Supreme Court in LG matters was its decision in July 2014 that no state governor has the power to remove a democratically elected local government official.

In summary, the current situation is an extant constitution that has enshrined local governments which are incongruous in a federal democracy (a carry-over from 1979 Constitution) – made worse by the listing of 774 LGAs in the constitution. At the level of praxis, the Executive at the federal level between 1999 and 2007 increased central government’s control on LGs while the Executive in some States abrogated the democratic essence of LGs. In both cases, the Supreme Court came to the rescue to check the excesses of the Executive. But the fundamental contradiction in the maintenance of LGs consistent with a unitary military government in a federal democracy is yet to be addressed.

LGs in Nigeria’s Federal Democracy: Some Suggestions

It is arguable that President Umaru Yar’Adua would have championed amendments to the provisions on LGs in the 1999 Constitution to ensure consistency with a federal system of government if his tenure had not been abridged by ill-health and eventual death.  In 2008, he had made the following commitment: “I have also directed that all laws be examined that go against the federal system so that they will be amended to be in conformity with the federal system of government” (published in various national newspapers on May 20th 2008). With the recent conversion of President Muhammadu Buhari (PMB) to “true” federalism – interpreted here as a conscious abandonment of a unitary system that aligned with his military culture – he could be the champion to adopt and ensure full implementation of his predecessor’s commitment.

I would suggest that the desirable next step is for PMB to constitute a Technical (NOT consultative) Committee to draw on existing recommendations that relate to LGs to prepare an Executive Bill that would contain what would qualify as the national consensus on LGs in a federal democracy. The Bill should be submitted to the National Assembly (NASS) before the end of the third month of his second term, that is, by end August 2019. And it would be a significant achievement if, before end December 2019, PMB were to sign a NASS Bill that spells out the necessary amendments relating to LGs in the 1999 Constitution with inappropriate provisions expunged and new desirable provisions incorporated.

I would expect the constitutional amendments to be adapted to include the following:

1. Affirmation that the States alone constitute the federating units of the Nigerian federation and that local governments are sub-jurisdictions of state governments. This was the consensus reached at the 2014 National Political Conference and is shared by many opinion leaders who have expressed views on the subject since 1999.
2. Flowing from (1), Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution would be expunged with the exception of (a) the first part of 7, (1) The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this Constitution guaranteed”. This would be consistent with the 2014 decision of the Supreme Court already cited. An appropriate sanction for any State without a democratically elected local government should be added. (b) 7, (6) on the allocation of public revenue to local government councils.
3. Furthermore the list of Local Government Areas in “First Schedule, Part I, States of the Federation” should be expunged.
4. Regarding public revenue allocation, the allocation for LGs from the Federation Account should be to the States as sensibly recommended by the 2014 National Political Conference. However, instead of the prevailing practice of sharing the percentage of the Federation Account due to LGs among 774 LGs, the amount should be shared among the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (considered as a state for this purpose). The formula for sharing could be based on the following criteria: equality, population and land area.

Three Closing Observations

First, accepting that LGs in Nigeria’s federal democracy would be sub-jurisdictions of State governments ought to mean that the prevailing nonsensical quasi-uniformity across LGs with respect to pay levels of political appointees (notably chairmen) would be abandoned: each State will henceforth pay according to what it considers appropriate based on both affordability and the performance of LG’s, especially with respect to local revenue mobilisation. Normally, some LGs in a State should be more equal than others.

Second, the very poor performance of LGs in “virtually all of Nigeria” as noted by one of the 774 LGAs in March 2007 (Vanguard, March 30, 2007) is likely to be replaced by varying performance standards that would be broadly aligned with the performance of the different states.

Third, and finally,  I would like to recommend the re-establishment of a National Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (NACIR) whose mandate will be to systematically study and monitor federal/state, state/local, and federal-state-local relations and advise all three spheres of government on how best to ensure cooperative and collaborative relationships while minimizing conflicts. (A NACIR-like institution existed briefly between the late 1980s and early 1990s).