1.2 Inauguration of the Committee: The Committee, which President Goodluck Jonathan said comprised “Nigerians with wide experience from various disciplines”, was officially inaugurated in the Council Chamber, State House, Presidential Villa, Abuja, on Monday, 7lh October, 2013. The Committee was given six (6) weeks to complete its assignment.

1.3 Foundational Principles: In his inaugural address to the Committee (Appendix I), President Goodluck Jonathan described the formation of this Committee as “a child of necessity”. He stated the “foundational principles that drive the action” of constituting the Committee to work towards convening a national conversation. He emphasized that, “this is a National Project, a sincere and fundamental undertaking, aimed at realistically examining and genuinely resolving, long-standing impediments to our cohesion and harmonious development as a truly United Nation”. The President further stressed that, “sitting down to talk is one right step in calming down tensions and channeling our grievances, misgivings and suggestions into more positive use for the good of our country”.

1.4 The President further stated that Nigerians are already talking about their national problems through the print and electronic media. He suggested that, “the only thing is that while these talks are sometimes weighty, they often lack direction. This Committee is to lend weight and direction to this national conversation”. He also allayed “the fears of those who think the Conference will call the integrity of Nigeria into question”, and added that, “this National Discourse will strengthen our union and address issues that are often on the front burner, and are too frequently ignored”.

1.5 Mr. President charged the Committee members “to consult widely before sitting down to develop the framework that will guide and guard the proceedings of the discussions”. He reminded members of the Committee that, “no voice is too small and no option is irrelevant”, urging the Committee to carry along the views of both enthusiasts and skeptics alike. He urged them to bear in mind, “that what we desire is what can work for the good of our people and country” and concluded that, “the goal is to bequeath a better and a greater Nigeria to the present and the generations to come”.

1.6 Terms of Reference: The Committee was given the following terms of reference:

1. To consult with all relevant stakeholders with a view to drawing up a feasible agenda for the proposed national dialogue/conference;

2 To make recommendations to Government on structure and modalities for the proposed national dialogue/conference;

3. To make recommendations to Government on how representation of various interest groups at .the national dialogue/conference will be determined;

A. To advise Government on a time-frame for the national dialogue/conference;

5. To advise Government on a Legal framework for the national dialogue/conference;

6. To advise on legal procedures and options for integrating decisions and outcomes of the national dialogue/conference – into the Constitution and Laws of the nation; and

7. To advise Government on any other matter that may be related or incidental to the proposed national dialogue.

1.8 Inaugural Meeting and. Take-off of the Committee: The Committee started its assignment a few hours after its inauguration on Monday, 7′” October, 2013 at the Transcorp Hilton, Abuja. Its inaugural meeting, was held and several other meetings followed thereafter, throughout the first week of the Committee’s assignment. In that first week, the Committee deliberated on the methodology it would employ in carrying out its assignment and drew up a Work Plan for the accomplishment of its mandate.

1.9 The Secretariat of the Committee used the first week to put in place the administrative machinery required for the discharge of the Committee’s mandate.

1.10 Work Plan and Strategy: The Committee deliberated extensively on the strategies to guide its work, on the basis of which, it designed a Work Plan (Appendix 2). Based on the Work Plan, the Committee then worked out an Itinerary (Appendix 3) for holding of Interactive Sessions at thirteen (13) Centres across the country – two in each Geo-Political! Zone and the Federal Capital, Abuja, as well as other strategies for carrying out the assignment.

1-11 Slight Change in the Committee’s Composition: The composition of the Committee was slightly changed. Professor Ben Nwabueze (SAN, NNOM) whose name was on the original list of members up to the time the Committee was inaugurated, was not available to serve because of health challenges. He was subsequently replaced by Professor Anya O. Anya (FAS, OFR, NNOM), Another change was in respect of Col. Tony Nyiam (Rtd) who was replaced by Solomon Asemota Esq. (SAN) following an incident which took place during the Committee’s Interactive Session in Benin City. A section of the participants at that Interactive Session took exception to a comment by Governor Adams Oshiomhole that the proposed Conference would not be different from previous ones the resolutions of which were not implemented. They started booing him and made it impossible for him to continue with his speech, Col. Nyiam then interrupted the Governor. This led to some commotion and eventually the Committee was advised to call off the meeting. A meeting of the Committee was held to address this incident. Members expressed their displeasure at Col Nyiam’s behavior. He resigned and was replaced by Solomon Asemota Esq. (SAN).

CHAPTER Two – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 This survey covers the colonial and post-colonial periods during which several constitutional arrangements were made in the country. Colonial constitutions included the Clifford Constitution (1922), Richards Constitution (1946), Macpherson Constitution (1951), Lyttleton Constitution (1954), and the Independence Constitution (1960). Post-colonial attempts included the 1963 Republican Constitution, the 1979 Constitution, the 1999 Constitution, and a few other drafts that were not given official ratification.

2.2 The integrity and acceptance of any Constitution depend on two elements, namely, process and content. Process has to do with issues of consultation and popular participation in the course of setting up the-constitutional arrangements. Debates, negotiations and compromise are all considered healthy for the process. Content deals with the body of articles and key provisions in the constitution. If either of these elements is perceived as being unrepresentative of people’s wishes, the constitution is considered unsatisfactory and defective. The context in which a constitution is made is also important in determining whether due consultations would be made or whether its key provisions would promote the interest of the people.

2.3 Not all colonial constitutions passed this test. Again, it is doubtful” if this could have been otherwise given the unequal power relations between colonial authorities and their subjects, The Clifford Constitution of 1922 and Richards Constitution of 1946 were both regarded as colonial impositions. Richards Constitution was particularly criticised because there was already a pool of articulate elite in the country who felt excluded from the process. Colonial authorities tried to redress this by convening constitutional conferences before subsequent constitutions were introduced.

Perhaps, the best illustration of this is the Macpherson Constitution that was preceded by extensive consultations. There were village-level meetings, district meetings, provincial meetings and regional conferences. The last stage was the National Conference held in Ibadan in 1950. The result of this was the Macpherson Constitution, which became operative in 1951. However, by 1953 -just two years later – there were already calls for revisions in the 1951 arrangement. The reason tor this could be found in the intersection between constitutional content and prevailing political/ideological climate. As the political environment was rapidly changing with accelerated impetus for increasing regional autonomy and self-rule, the two-year old constitutional arrangement suddenly became outdated.

2.4 Again, in terms of content, the piecemeal or incremental approach that characterized the provisions of previous colonial constitutions was no longer acceptable in the 1950s. For instance, even though amalgamation of the Northern and Southern provinces was in 1914, it was the Richards Constitution that provided for a single legislative authority for the entire country in 1946. Prior to this time, the Legislative Council covered only the South while the North was ruled by proclamations issued by the Governor. It thus took 32 years for the North and South to be brought under the same legislative coverage. Another example was incremental participation of Nigerians at both the legislative and executive levels. Clifford’s Constitution in 1922 provided for four elected members – three from

Lagos and one from Calabar in a legislative Council that comprised 19 unofficial and 27 official members. It took 27 years for. elected majorities to emerge in the central legislature and regional Houses of Assembly through the instrumentality of the 1951 constitution.

Similarly, the same constitution provided for 9 officials in the Regional Executive Council and 9 Nigerian Ministers. The Central Executive Council of Ministers had 7 officials, including the Governor as President and 12 Nigerian Ministers (four from each Region). Meanwhile, the first Nigerian member of the Executive Council was appointed in 1943.

2.5 By the 1950s, nationalists were impatient to take over power. This decade, compared with previous decades afforded them significant legislative experience before independence in 1960. They also got several opportunities to participate, within a framework set up by colonial authorities, in constitutional arrangements through ‘the various constitutional conferences and talks that took place within the decade (1954,1957/58, in London). The eventual outcome of all these was the Independence Constitution of 1960.

2.6 Post-colonial constitutions had a different orientation in terms of process and content. Apart from the 1963 Republican Constitution, others such as the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions were made within the context of military administrations. Even then, the military still made some attempts to give some semblance of consultation to their constitution-making processes. Here, the case of the 1979 Constitution is particularly apposite. The process commenced in 1975 when the Murtala Mohammed regime appointed a 49-member Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), headed by Chief Rotimi Williams to produce a draft constitution, which was to serve as the main working document for the Constituent Assembly (CA)’that later emerged in 1977. The CA comprised 232 members elected indirectly by an electoral college constituted at the local councils. The CA examined and debated the draft constitution extensively. After final ratification by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the constitution was promulgated in 1979. As far as the military regime was concerned, the inclusion of the CA within the exercise had legitimized the process.

2.7 Similarly, General Sani Abacha, through Decree No.1 of 1994 established a Constitutional Conference. Of the 369 members, 273 were elected by the populace in a non-partisan election, while 96 were nominated by government. Headed by Justice A.G, Karibi-Whyte, the Conference produced a draft constitution, which was submitted in 1995. After the death of General Abacha in 1998, his successor, General Abdusalami Abubakar set up a 25-member Constitution Debate Coordination Committee to amend the 1995 draft. The 1999 constitution eventually grew out of this exercise and was ratified by the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of the military regime, Despite the attempts made by the military authorities to involve some sections of the populace in constitution-making, these two constitutions (1979 and 1999) are still regarded by the Nigerian elite as impositions by military regimes. In between these two exercises were other attempts made during the administration of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. There was a Political Bureau set up under the leadership of S. J. Cookey to conduct a national debate on the political future of the country and propose a “viable and enduring people-oriented political system devoid of perennial disruptions”. The Bureau submitted its recommendations in March 1987. The second was a Constitutional Review Committee sot up to review the 1979 Constitution. The result of this review was the 1989 Constitution. It was not ratified but portions of it were promulgated as Decrees.

2.8 Next is the issue of the content of post-colonial constitutions. The general trend in these constitutions is that they tend to build on, and strengthen existing principles in previous constitutions or where there are contentious issues, try to resolve them. In other words, a new constitution is designed to improve on some areas or attend to matters arising from a previous constitution which serves as its point of reference. Technically, therefore, the idea of a ‘brand new’ constitution that owes nothing to its predecessor is difficult to envisage (except, perhaps, in a new state where no such ‘predecessor’ existed). The 1963 Republican Constitution, for instance, like the 1960 Constitution was based on the Westminster system of government. The key differences were in the provisions for a ceremonial President in place of the Queen of England, and that the judicial appeal system should terminate with the Supreme Court and not the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council.

2.9 In cases where previous constitutional arrangements were regarded as the cause of socio-political instability and crises, the new constitutions tended to focus on resolving these issues through a revised arrangement, but with the old constitution as reference point. For example, the breakdown of the First Republic was attributed to conflict mining from regional politics, ethnic domination, minority oppression, etc. To resolve this, the 1979 Constitution abandoned the Westminster system in favour of the Presidential system with a directly elected executive. To further avoid the pitfalls of the First Republic, political parties and cabinet positions were to reflect a new “Federal Character” principle. Political parties were to be broad-based and not regional. Again, while the First Republic Senate was a ceremonial body, the I979 Constitution gave the Senate and House of Representatives coequal powers. The 1999 Constitution, in most respects, still bears a strong resemblance to the 1979 Constitution in terms of its key structures.

2.10 This brief survey has underscored the significance of process** and content in constitution making in Nigeria. This observation is equally applicable elsewhere. Consultative and participatory processes arc seen to be ideal because these allow for negotiations and compromise and help foster a sense of ownership. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, this has not always been enjoyed. Colonial constitutions can hardly be described as growing out of “free debate” with no “no-go” areas. Even the wide consultations that preceded the Macpherson Constitution and subsequent constitutions took place within a framework prescribed by colonial authorities. All issues were still subject to their approval. Constitutions made within the military apparatus were equally considered unsatisfactory. The demand for a new constitutional arrangement thus continues. The National Political -Reform Conference set up in 2005 by General Olusegun Obasanjo produced a draft that was unpopular. In 2012, the Justice S.M.A. Belgore – led Presidential Committee on Review of Outstanding Issues from Recent Constitutional Conferences prepared a detailed report that is yet to be implemented. It is, therefore, anticipated that the proposed National Conference will constitute a viable landmark in the constitutional landscape of Nigeria.

2.11 State of The Nation: Since the military exited from power, there have been persistent, calls for the reform of the political system in such a manner to command the respect of Nigerians and be seen to be fair, just and equitable. With appropriate structures, leadership and other national problems – inter – elite rivalries, reciprocal suspicion, hostility of position and status conflicts among Nigerian elite, mutually reinforcing cleavages – could be reasonably managed through the democratic process. In this regard Nigeria needs a system of shared power, bearing in mind that political institutions make it difficult for reckless and lawless political adventurers to thrive. The choice before the country is either to stick with our present political arrangement, which favour over centralisation of governance and resources or to recognise our irrepressible pluralism and the necessity for voluntary integration. Coercive integration or – integration by force or by intimidation – has failed all over the world including Africa.

2.12 The persistent call for “true federalism” is nothing but a call for decentralisation and devolution of power. It is expected too that decentralisation would redeem the country from its constant perennial fluctuation between social crises and chronic political instability and threats of disintegration. No amount of government – sponsored propaganda and jingles can really make up for a defective political structure or for institutional and leadership failures.