By Douglas Anele

Although the visit was cancelled eventually, it did not prevent the Kano riots in which scores of Ndigbo were murdered. Therefore, it is very clear that during the colonial period and shortly after independence, the British colonialists were obsessed with maintaining what until now is euphemistically referred to as “One Nigeria” for her own neo-colonialist agenda, notwithstanding the centrifugal forces of ethnicity and religion pulling in the opposite direction.

Moreover, nationalists from Southern Nigeria, especially those of Igbo extraction, did not want the country to break up. Consequently, Northern leaders on several occasions successfully used threat of secession as a strategy to get concessions. This blows to smithereens the canard that Northern domination of government at the centre which actually began before independence is justified because the North has always been more populous than Southern Nigeria. It also indicates, as subsequent events that led to the tragic Biafran war proved, that the lousy policy of appeasing the North at every turn was a grievous mistake. The first military coup of January 15, 1966, which we alluded to a moment ago, is one of the most deliberately distroted and misinterpreted events in Nigeria’s chequered history. For, despite the fact that ringleaders of the bloody putsch, including Maj. Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and Maj. Adewale Ademoyega, unanimously disavowed ethnicity as a motivating factor in their coup calculus, and insisted that they intended to appoint a prominent Yoruba politician, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Prime Minister if the coup had succeeded, many Nigerians, including so-called “experts,” still believe that the insurrection was an Igbo coup. Chuks Iloegbunam, in his gripping story about the first military head of state, Maj. Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, entitled Ironside, has masterfully refuted the notion of Igbo coup that only a few points will be reiterated here.

First, as we already noted, Nzeogwu and his cohorts intended to release Awolowo, from prison and appoint him (not Dr. Azikiwe) Prime Minister. Second, in Lagos, the federal capital which had to be taken before any coup could succeed, several of the key positions in the army were held by Igbo officers whose cooperation the coup plotters would need to carry through their plan. Now, the most strategic units of army formations in Lagos, namely, the

Second Battalion and the Guards Company, were commanded by Igbo officers. Thus, if what happened in the early hours of January 15 were truly an Igbo coup, Ironsi, as the most senior army officer in the country at that time, would have mobilised these critical sections of the army to ensure that the conspiracy succeeded instead of using them to frustrate it.

Third, Ironsi, not Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, as alleged in certain quarters, led the soldiers in Lagos which included Col. Hilary Mbilitem Njoku, that aborted the coup. Maj. John Obienu, an Igbo who commanded the Second Reconnaissance Squadron in Abeokuta, was part of the Nzeogwu conspiracy, but he failed his colleagues at the last minute. Given all this, why would Ironsi and some senior Igbo military officers work to neutralise the coup or Obienu disappoint his co-conspirators if the coup were part of the purported Igbo agenda for dominating the country?

Finally, before the coup, Ndigbo occupied a preponderance of key positions in politics, the military and civil service compared to other ethnic groups, a point buttressed by Prof. Chinua Achebe in his book, There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra, where he stated that the Igbo led the nation in virtually every sector. A few examples will suffice to make the case that, given their preeminent position in the country before Nzeogwu’s coup, the Igbo had no good reason to seek drastic change in the status quo. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was President, Dr. A. A. Nwafor-Orizu, Senate President, Maj. Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi, General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, Col. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General of the Army, among others. The fact that prominent Igbo politicians and military officers escaped assassination during the coup was due to sheer happenstance. For instance, Azikiwe was convalescing in London after an operation for a lung infection when the coup was executed. In the Eastern region, troops of the First Battalion surrounded the residences of the Premier and regional leaders and waited for orders to attack.

Nnamdi Azikiwe, Ahmadu Bello and Obafemi Awolowo

Before Majs. Emmanuel Ifeajuna and David Okafor could arrive Enugu by road in the early hours of January 15 to issue the orders, Maj. David Ejoor, who was ordered by Ironsi to resume command in Enugu as fast as possible, got there first by plane and withdrew the troops. As the day progressed, forces loyal to Ironsi dismantled the rebellion.

The Nzeogwu-led coup failed to achieve one of its principal objectives, namely, installation of Awolowo as Prime Minister. However, it led to the collapse of the First Republic. Note that Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa and S. L. Akintola were informed about the impending coup, but none of them considered the mater serious enough to take measures for their own safety. If they had done so and escaped assassination, the coup of July 1966 with its tragic consequences might not have happened. Interestingly, Ironsi’s government was well received at the initial stage, even by some emirs in the North.

All over the country, people celebrated the end of the rule of corrupt politicians and hoped fervently for a new dawn. Ironsi did what he could given the trying circumstances of that time to repair the damage caused by bickering inept politicians.

Pursuant to that, he attempted to enhance national unity by promulgating the Unification Decree 34, which was later used by certain Northern elements in the army and civil society to justify the vicious coup against him. Now, contrary to the false claim by Isawa Elaigwu and Karl Maier that he unduly favoured the Igbo in appointments and promotions in the military and bureaucracy, Ironsi bent over backwards to accommodate the interests of all regions in his decisions, to the extent of eliciting criticisms from fellow Easterners, not just the Igbo.

Take for example the nine-man Supreme Military Council under him. Aside from Ironsi himself, Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu was the only Igbo, and he had an ex officio status as one of the four regional military governors. The other member from Eastern region was Lt. Col. George Kurubo, an indigene of Rivers State. Of the six civilian members of the federal executive council, two of them, Gabriel Onyiuke (Igbo) and Louis Edet (Efik), were from the East. Instead of reconstituting the permanent secretary portfolios to favour the Igbo, as one would expect from an ethnic chauvinist, Ironsi reappointed the twenty-three permanent secretaries he inherited from Balewa’s government thus: North 8, Mid-West 7, West 5, and East 3. A Westerner, a Northerner, and an Englishman headed the three tribunals he set up to investigate the Nigerian Railway Corporation, Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and the Lagos City Council.

Twenty-five General Managers, Chairmen and Secretaries of federal corporations were distributed as follows, Western region 12, Northern Region 6, Eastern region 3, Mid-West 1, and foreigners 3. That is not all. Ironsi appointed Lt. Col. Gowon as his Chief of Army Staff, Mallam Hamsad Amadu, a young relative of the Sadauna of Sokoto, as his private secretary, and his personal escort, composed mostly of Hausa soldiers, was commanded by another young Hausa, Lt. W.G. Walbe.

TO BE CONTINUED