Law & Human Rights

August 1, 2013

Required proof for criminal allegations: A critique (2)

By Akintayo Iwilade

Like we argued earlier, the strict rule was developed to ensure “only guilty persons are convicted by the State”. Therefore, it is the end goal of a proceeding that should ordinarily determine the standard of proof to be applied.  The ‘strict rule’ ought only to apply where the end goal of a proceeding seeks conviction of a citizen by the State and not where the end goal is a pursuit of compensatory damages, injunctive/restorative reliefs, declarations, restitutive orders etc; such as are often sought in civil and election petition proceedings respectively.

Sound logic is therefore diminished when a Plaintiff, Claimant or Petitioner is required (just to obtain compensatory damages, injunctive/restorative reliefs, declarations etc), to demonstrate the wholesome prosecutorial powers of the State to arrest, gather, investigate and even confiscate required ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt evidence’. It becomes more untenable when it is considered that such Plaintiff, Claimant or Petitioner hardly ever possesses the supportive privileges and ‘investigative infrastructure’ available, often exclusively, to the State.

Accordingly, it betrays uneven and illogical justice to impose the onerous ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ evidential burden on aspects of such proceedings, in which different outcomes, other than the conviction sought by the State in criminal proceedings, are what is being sought.

From the decisions in Torti v. Ukpabi (1984) 1 SCNLR 214, Nwobodo v Onoh (1984) 1 SC 1, Omoboriowo v. Ajasin (1984) 1 SC 1 etc; to the recent cases involving Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (pt. 941) pg 1 at 182, Agagu v Mimiko (2009) All FWLR (pt. 462) 1122 at 1167-1168 and many others, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and all Lower Tribunals have left no one in doubt of the state of the Law on the standard of proof required to judicially verify criminal allegations made in Election Petitions throughout Nigeria.

The standard is, and remains, that ‘criminal allegations made in Election Petitions must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and; where an Election Petition is founded solely on such criminal allegations and there happens to be a wanting in the stated statutory standard of proof, the petition cannot succeed’. That is the state of the Law today, and it remains firmly so and continually enforceable, except, and until set-aside by an Act of Parliament.

That being the State of the Law, it is posited that there is no logical jurisprudential foundation to support or justify the continued application and imposition of such onerous evidential burden on Election Petitions.  A dynamic reversal of the current Law, through concerted legislative and jurisprudential rethinking, is highly desirable.

Akintayo Iwilade- Lagos-based Legal Practitioner