By Ladipo Adamolekun
The federal system is, under the present conditions, the only basis on which Nigeria can remain united. Tafawa Balewa (1957).

In 1970, Nigeria adopted the following five national goals of development .

“a united, strong and self-reliant nation

“a great and dynamic economy

“a just and egalitarian society

“a land of bright and full opportunity for all citizens

“a free and democratic society

Forty years later, we have failed (woefully) to fully achieve any of the five goals.  Indeed, many would argue that we have regressed in respect of a majority of the goals.  Yet, if an opinion poll were conducted among a representative sample across age groups, ethnic groups, religious groups and geopolitical zones in April 2011, a clear majority is very likely to endorse the same national goals of development.  If these are the desirable goals, why have we failed to make progress towards achieving them and what must we do differently to fully achieve these goals by 2050?

Based on continuous study as well as insights obtained as a participant-observer during Nigeria’s first fifty years of independence, I am in full agreement with my colleague, Adele Jinadu, that we face triple challenges: of federalism, democracy and development.

Tackling these challenges would require serious attention to the strong linkages among them: to achieve a well-functioning federal system (which must be a genuinely devolved federation) would require economic progress and the embrace of a democratic culture just as good development performance is, to a considerable extent, dependent on the embrace of good democratic practice.  These issues and linkages are examined below.

Inevitability of a Devolved Federation

As I have observed elsewhere, to keep Nigeria one, federalism is a necessity, not a choice (Adamolekun, 2005).  The challenge is to accommodate the ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, regional and geographical divisions within a federation that is at the same time democratic and capable of advancing socioeconomic progress.

In the circumstance, continued maintenance of the centralism and uniformity of the military era is antithetical to the goal of keeping Nigeria one; devolution is the only viable way forward.   It is worth recalling that each of the constituent regions of the federation at its birth in 1954 had threatened to secede at one time or the other: the North in 1950 (before the federation was formally established) and in 1966 following the declaration of Nigeria as a unitary state; the West in 1953 (again, before the formal establishment of the federation) and a virtual “secession threat” in 1998/99; and the East in 1966, resulting in a 30-month civil war.

A putative independent “Delta Peoples Republic” was declared in 1966 but the military promptly arrested its leaders and the so-called republic died.  In 1990 an abortive coup d’état led by a military officer from one of the north central zones announced the “suspension” of the Hausa-Fulani and/or Muslim states of the north eastern and north western zones from the federation.

Arising from the lessons from operating the Nigerian federal system to date as well as the lessons from international good practices, I would argue that the following two critical issues need to feature prominently in the design of a new devolved federal system for Nigeria: political restructuring and autonomy and reallocation of functions and resources.

Political restructuring and autonomy

On the basis of viewpoints documented in various publications (newspapers, magazines and books) since the early 1990s, a significant number of opinion leaders from different parts of the country support a comprehensive restructuring of the polity.

The overall objective of political restructuring should be the establishment of autonomous (self-governing) nationalities or groups of nationalities within a federal union with a small coordinating central government.  Two examples of issues that would need greater clarity than what exists in the 1999 Constitution are institutional arrangements for local self-governance and how best to accommodate the enforcement of “national minimum standards” in certain areas.

Because full clarity cannot be spelled out in a constitution, I would suggest the adoption of a negotiated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as a companion document to the constitution.  In the MOU, operational guidelines relating to certain concepts and issues would be spelled out in detail.

Examples of concepts and issues whose operational details would need to be spelled out in the MOU would include, among others, the concepts of federal character, and local self-governance; and such issues as mechanisms for conducting relations between federal, state and local governments; enforcement of “national minimum standards” (of specific public services); and enforcement of checks and balances.

Of course, those who fear that fundamental political restructuring (devolution) could lead to the balkanization of the country (or worse, disintegration), could point to some international experiences such as the unending referendums on “sovereignty” in Quebec, Canada and talk of a “free state associated with Spain” (and represented in the European Union) by some separatists and regionalists in Catalonia in Spain.

But it can also be argued that each country has remained one because it has implemented significant devolution of powers in response to demands by their disaffected constituent parts.  Nigeria’s post-independence experience to date constitutes a strong case for what one might call the inevitability of devolution.

It is important to stress that sub-national governments that would enjoy the degree of devolved powers advocated here would need to match their autonomy with consistent practice of good governance, notably respect for the rule of law and human rights, participation, transparency and accountability as well as tangible economic progress.  Otherwise, there would be new groups within the different sub-national governments that would cry out against new forms of marginalization.

Reallocation of functions and resources

For obvious reasons, a major aspect of political restructuring and autonomy relates to the allocation of functions and resources in the new federal system.

Drawing on functional allocation under the 1954 Constitution and international good practices, the responsibilities of the federal government should be limited to currency and foreign exchange, external security and aspects of internal security, external affairs, foreign trade, railways and inter-state transportation and aspects of regulatory administration.

State and local governments should have responsibility for all other functions.  And the revenue allocation formula applied to the Federation Account should reflect this assignment of functions.  In particular, the revenue allocation system, should accord to derivation the same 50 percent share, as was the case in the 1954 Constitution, including the recent suggestion on vesting aspects of the exploitation of mineral resources in capable indigenous companies.

This approach to the allocation of functions and resources would result in a decentralized economic policy and management.

It is important to stress that the enduring unity of the Nigerian federation cannot be assured through the prevailing inherited military-style centralism and uniformity.  Persistent fears about the fragility of the federation after almost three decades of strict application of that approach, and about twelve years of imitations of the same approach, constitute a strong justification for adopting and implementing a different approach.

The desirable new approach, I suggest, is a devolved federal system with the characteristics that are spelled out above.  It is only devolution that can unleash the forces for consolidating democracy and achieving accelerated socioeconomic progress in Nigeria.  The alternative to devolution, I fear, will be the death of the federation.

Democracy and development

Leaving aside the details of the debate in the development literature on the link between democracy and development (Lipset 1959, Ake 1991, and Diamond 1992), the empirical evidence in post-independence SSA shows a positive correlation between good democratic practice and good development performance on the one hand, and poor democratic practice and poor development performance, on the other.

We consider the following as evidence of good democratic practice: respect for rule of law and equality of all before the law; free, fair and transparent elections held as and at when due; respect for the principles of freedom of speech and association; respect for human rights; and attention to enforcement of accountability, accompanied by low level of corruption.

The criteria for good development performance would be a satisfactory record in respect of a combination of Human Development Index (HDI), poverty rates, World Economic Forum ratings, Global Competiveness Report ranking, and progress in implementing the MDGs.

On the basis of available evidence on the development performance of SSA countries during the last two decades – as reflected in a majority of the criteria listed above – the countries with good democratic practice record (notably, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, and South Africa) have been systematically rated higher than those cited as examples of poor democratic practice (notably, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe).

Furthermore, I have demonstrated elsewhere (Adamolekun, 2008) how “getting electoral legitimacy right” in Benin, Botswana and Ghana is contributing to economic progress in these countries.  It is also the case that Botswana that is widely acknowledged as the most democratic country in SSA, is the only African country among thirteen countries world-wide that recorded seven percent GDP growth rate or higher for 25 years or longer since the early 1960s.

Perhaps the most glaring illustration of the correlation between poor democratic practice and poor development performance in the late 2000s was provided in Zimbabwe. After the incumbent president in Zimbabwe had refused fair electoral contest with his opposition challenger in 2008, he used state security forces to suppress the opposition and famously declared as follows: “Zimbabwe is mine” – an assertion of authoritarianism that has nothing to envy a military dictator.

As he clung to power, the economy virtually collapsed with monthly inflation rate at a world-record 13.2 billion per cent; the education and health sectors  were on their knees; several millions of citizens were in deepening poverty; and about five million others were in voluntary exile for economic and/or political reasons.

It is important to acknowledge the need to nuance the assertion about a positive correlation between good democratic practice and good development performance on the one hand, and poor democratic practice and poor development performance, on the other.

The good development performance recorded in the 1970s and 1980s by some developing countries that would, by the evidence available in the development literature, score below average in a majority of the criteria of “good democratic practice” is often cited as a counterfactual.

The countries concerned are Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand (the so-called “Asian Tigers”).  The explanations for this phenomenon include the fortunate combination of good political leadership, predictability of the justice system and administrative competence (The Economist, 1993 and Adamolekun, 2009).  Above all, each of these countries has taken significant steps during the last decade in the direction of increased accountability.

Table 1 below provides further illustration of the limits to the correlation between good democratic practice and development performance.  With the exception of Ghana and Tanzania, the other countries (including Nigeria) with strong GDP growth rates recorded/forecast between five and fifteen years would not qualify as having good democratic practice.  For now, it is difficult to predict how the situation in each of the countries will evolve.  Our thoughts on the possible scenarios for Nigeria are summarised in the concluding section below.

TABLE1:

Africa’s Fastest Growing Economies, 2001 – 2015 (GDP growth rate)

Country    2001- 2010    2011- 2015

Angola    11.1%

Nigeria    8.9%    6.8%

Ethiopia    8.4%    8.1%

Mozambique    7.9%    7.7%

Chad    7.9%

Rwanda    7.6%

Tanzania        7.2%

Congo        7.0%

Ghana        7.0%

Zambia        6.9%

Notes: (1) The African “Lions” listed are among the top ten in the world for each period covered.

(2) Countries with less than 10m population are excluded.

Source: The Economist (London), January 8th 2011.

Conclusion: Three possible scenarios

In my opinion, it would not be unfair to assert that at the end of the country’s first fifty years, our report card should read: “still muddling, not yet through” – to borrow the felicitous expression of the American scholar, Charles Lindblom (1959).

I would argue that “muddling through” approach will not carry us safely through another half-century.  However, at this juncture, it remains one of the scenarios in Nigeria’s future that I can envisage. To this, I would add two other scenarios:

A. Maintenance of the status quo: muddling through until the country settles for either B or C below.

B. Optimistic scenario: the country finds a viable path to achieving a federal democracy and economic prosperity.

C. Pessimistic scenario: the dreaded “D” word – disintegration of the federation.

In conclusion, I would like to assert that the two positions taken in this paper constitute a “viable path” to achieving a federal democracy and economic prosperity (scenario B).  To arrive at this destination within the next quarter century or less, it is imperative that leaders and followers commit to the simultaneous pursuit of a devolved federal system and good democratic practice combined with good development performance.

References

Adamolekun, L. 2005: “Nigerian federation at the crossroads: the way forward,” Publius, The

Journal of Federalism, 35, 3, 383-405

__________. 2008: The governors and the governed. Towards improved accountability for achieving good development performance. Ibadan: Spectrum Books (Nigeria National Merit Award Winners’ Lecture).

__________. 2009.  “Getting electoral legitimacy right – three African success stories” in Vanguard, January 28

Ake, Claude. 1991. “Rethinking African democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 2, 1, 32-44.

Diamond, L. 1992. “Economic development and democracy reconsidered”, American Behavioural Scientist, 35, 4/5, 450-499.

Lindblom, C. 1959. “Still muddling, not yet through”, Public Administration Review, 39, 517-529.

Lipset, S. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”. The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1, 1959, 69-105.