By Hakeem Baba-Ahmed

There can be hope only for a society which acts as one big family, and not as many separate ones —Anwar Al-Sadat, President of Egypt 1918 – 1981.

IT is now tragically obvious that neither government nor Boko Haram will accept that it is losing a war which is bringing unprecedented levels of fear, pain and deprivation to the nation. In the last few weeks, the Boko Haram insurgency has escalated its campaign of terror, and says that it is doing so in response to arrests, killings and detentions of its members in Maiduguri, Kano and Kaduna, among other areas.

It also claims to have issued threats to people in Sokoto through its leaders that it will attack the city if its members continue to be arrested. The government, on the other hand, has intensified its crackdown on members, and has made many arrests.

There are allegations and accusations in Maiduguri that suspected members of the insurgency were being murdered by soldiers after being arrested in their homes. Some prominent members of the group have been arrested and are undergoing interrogation, but neither the attacks nor the proganda from the group is abating.

The audacious attack on military formations in Kaduna on Tuesday February 7th, which is coming in the midst of the unceasing attacks on police stations in Kano is a reminder that the group’s intention is to continue to wage war against the Nigerian state and its agents, and if innocent citizens, muslims or christians alike get caught in the crossfire, it is just their ill-luck.

The manner this conflict is developing is now a matter of intense national and global concern, and it is threatening to trigger even wider conflicts in the polity. With all the human, technical and material resources at its disposal, government appears incapable of preventing spectacular and devastating attacks on security agents and the public.

Its intelligence, if it is has any, is obviously severely faulty, when it could not prevent large and coordinated attacks on many targets in Kano, and the subsequent attacks almost on a daily basis on police stations in the city.

This failure had long been registered in the nature of the endemic assaults in Borno, Yobe and Bauchi States in the last few months. But the recent attacks on military formations in Kaduna have exposed the weaknesses of the government and security agencies even more. Although from all appearances, Kaduna had long expected an attack, the fact that an attack was made at the heart of the military establishment in a city which houses the nation’s security assets, in spite of elaborate precautions, has shocked the nation.

The reported attempt to blow up the Kawo overhead bridge near the two military facilities indicate that the insurgency is beginning to target critical civilian infrastructure. If this is the plan, it will add a most frightening dimension to the conflict, and will in all likelihood, hurt the north even more than it is doing now, with the economy of Maiduguri in tatters, and Kano and those Kaduna feeling the intense heat.

Insurgency in the interest of Islam and muslims
On the other hand, the Boko Haram insurgency must by now be acutely aware that the general population is both afraid and angry with it. It is fighting a war in the name of Islam and muslims, and many of its victims are muslims who just want peace and are praying desperately to be delivered from Boko Haram bombs. It wants the same thing most muslims and christians want; which is a just and fair Nigeria where leaders live as God decrees, and where lives are not taken at will without repercussions.

Overwhelming majority of muslims still believe that suicide and murder are irredeemable sins, so the insurgency is unlikely to find overwhelming support among the Muslim community when it claims that it sacrifices lives of young people, and murders hundreds, in the interest of Islam and muslims.

Millions of muslims share the pain of the mass murder of muslims in Zangon Kataf, Zonkwa, Jos and Yelwan Shendam, but most muslims cannot see how the bombing and shooting of chrisitans and fellow muslims, as well as policemen and soldiers today will avenge those atrocities. Most Nigerians also doubt that Boko Haram will succeed in bringing the Nigerian state to its knees, and forcing it and all Nigerians, muslims and non-muslims alike, to live only under the Sharia or risk living in perpetual conflict.

Significantly, Boko Haram is operating in an environment which gives all muslims the comfort that if they are murdered, Allah Subhanahu Wa Taala will visit their sins on their murderers, and they, in turn, are assured of Aljanna Firdausi, while their killers will be condemned to hell.

As muslims, they should also know the fate of anyone who takes the life of another, whatever his faith, without just cause. There is also the danger that the insurgency will suffer splits, fatigue and a dilution of its essence, leading it to an inglorious defeat, or a long war with itself. The history of insurgencies the world over is consistent in demonstrating that it is born of a popular cause; it gathers momentum and taps into fear and genuine support, but will suffer defeat unless it has a capacity to know when to fight, and when to settle.

Dramatic improvement
Unless there is a dramatic improvement in the capacity of the Nigerian state to obliterate all traces of Boko Haram activity in the next few months, or a radical re-think on the part of Boko Haram to renounce all hostility, this conflict looks likely to drag on and take more casualties. Both possibilities appear highly unlikely.

Boko Haram leaders have very deep suspicions of the government’s offer to discuss their grievances, provided they can reveal themselves. They know that to expose themselves is to give up their strongest weapons; and they say  that past efforts to discuss with the agents of the government have betrayed them.

Government, on the other hand, is talking from many sides of its month, but will not admit to a failure to bring the insurgency to an end. It looks set to continue to throw troops and barricades at it. In the meantime, young people willing to commit suicide during missions appear to be more and more available to the insurgency. The ability to make local bombs appears to be spreading.

The sophistication and intelligence of the Boko Haram field operations appear to be improving. Their access to weapons, uniforms and detailed intelligence against the Nigerian security agents is improving. Above all, they are succeeding in terrorising host communities into silence and enforced acquiescence, which improves their capacities to operate within innocent localities.

These apparent collusions or silence attract hostility and some heavy-handed treatment from security agents, and local hostility against security agents rise, without necessarily tilting in favour of the insurgency. The insurgency scores another goal against the government, by raising public resentment and hostility around its attempts to fight those who wage a war against the state and citizens.

Opportunistic posturing assuming centre stage: Whether it was their intention or  not, the Boko Haram insurgency appears to have achieved some of the core objectives of terror. One is to induce fear in the minds of the public through the use of spectacular acts of violence aimed at the citizenry and the state in order to achieve political objectives. The second is to force the state to adapt its strategies and utilise its resources in the manner the terrorist organisations want; in other words, to get the state to adopt and act out the agenda of terror.

The third is to tap into a latent sentiment which glorifies successes against the state, most commonly found among those who share the world view of the insurgency. This guarantees for it a hard core of volunteers and latent admiration within its primary constituency. The longer the insurgency lasts, the more it taps into these assets.

The conflict with the Boko Haram insurgency is also opening up some old wounds which the nation can do without at this stage. Opportunistic posturing which question the utility and viability of the Nigerian state are assuming centre stage in a nation where appalling failure to govern well is already exposing many of our weaknesses.

Worn out and expired tribal champions who are unable to find space in mainstream political processes are setting up shops, reminding the nation that it never really was very far from what it is today: weak, afraid and drifting. They want tribal conclaves which should have powers over and above the constitution to decide how we should live; or whether we should live in one country at all.

Presumably, they see themselves as the leaders of these primitive constituencies. Elderly Nigerians who should build bridges across communities and assuage our fear are stoking fires of irredentism and conflict, because they are of no relevance otherwise.

A few with their eyes on compulsive applause from foreign lands say they know who Boko Haram are, but they lack the courage to name names. Many others think moving whole tribes and regions away from the Boko Haram insurgency and Nigeria will give them peace (and some relevance as small fish in small ponds).

Others think the mere talk of restructuring Nigeria will get the north all worried, and perhaps become marginalised even further from fully participating in the affairs of the nation. Those who think leaving or diluting the Nigerian state is their solution to the threat of Boko Haram are behaving like the man who locks up his shop in the market, because the market is on fire.

Practical steps towards resolution: The Nigerian government is desperately trying to get the United States to list Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation, with an eye on extensive assistance in funding, training, intelligence and logistics which is bound to be intrusive and complicating.

The U.S and its allies are reluctant to get overtly involved, while they are still licking their wounds from the adventures in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The rest of Africa is watching with marked trepidation, as the largest nation sinks into despair and reeks of inept governance.

All these make the need to explore some practical steps towards a comprehensive resolution of this stand-off imperative. One of these practical steps should involve exploring the value of mutual acceptance of a three months moratorium on all attacks and arrests. In these three months, avenues should be explored to put arrested Boko Haram suspects through the judicial process, and where it serves the law and public interest and security, they may be released from detention.

The insurgency leaders should also demonstrate their control over their people by ceasing all attacks, and perhaps, in this manner, they may expose criminals widely suspected to be killing Nigerians and attacking churches and banks and making it appear as if Boko Haram is responsible. It may help to assure the nation that Boko Haram’s claim that it attacks only agents of the state and those who betray it is, in fact, true.

After all, Boko Haram says many killings and destruction are done by agents of the state. Above all, it may help to convince the nation that the insurgency has both a capacity to inflict violence, as well as discipline and political maturity, and is not just a ragtag army of people who know how to make and explode bombs.
A three month moratorium on hostilities and arrest should be used by both the government and Boko Haram leadership to intensely explore options to their current strategies. The challenge, of course, is to find who will broker this ceasefire agreement.  Respected Ulama and other leaders should get involved in mediating between the two, with firm assurances that their safely and integrity will not be compromised. There must be people respected and trusted by Boko Haram leaders, and acceptable to government, who also have the courage to step forward. This is the time for leadership and sacrifice.

The period should be used to explore genuine avenues for resolving the core grievances of the insurgency, and no options should be excluded. By the end of the moratorium, a formal and structured platform should emerge which may allow an all-inclusive dialogue and a roadmap towards a comprehensive resolution.

Moratorium on hostilities
The proposal for a moratorium on hostilities, arrests and trials should be given serious consideration by those genuinely involved in the search for solutions. The north is paying a disproportionate price for this insurgency, which is a national problem. Where the national leadership fails to act, or has no ideas, northern leaders should step up their involvement for the search for peace.

Polite and politically-appropriate language will not do anymore.  The option of a ceasefire should be given serious consideration, because the only other option is a continuation of current hostilities which are threatening the lives of every Nigerian in the short term, and the future of the nation as one entity in the long term.

There will be some Nigerians who will scoff at the idea of the ceasefire and dialogue with Boko Haram insurgents, but they should be reminded that it was dialogue and massive concessions initiated by a President from the north that brought the delicate and expensive resolution to the Niger Delta insurgency. There may be some in government who will feel that government is capitulating. They should be reminded that the government is actually losing this war, and it shows no capacity to win it in the long run, going by its present disposition.

There may be some in the Boko Haram leadership who will insist on fighting on. But they should know that fighting alone, without some objectives which are achievable, is a wasteful exercise. The nation has taken note that Boko Haram has a grievance, and a capacity to force attention to it. It is time to consolidate on this, and not fritter it away in a war that is fast taking its toll on it.

Above all, it is time for all Nigerians, particularly those respected by the people as men and women with unimpeachable integrity, leaders of opinion and the ulama to stand between the government and the Boko Haram insurgency, and broker a ceasefire for at least three months.