By Ladipo Adamolekun
(Written on December 3, 1993)

As we approach the mid-point of the last decade of the 20th century, Nigeria is at a crossroads in every sense of the word.  The triumph of the military party in the face of a disunited civilian elite (who should lead the civilian party) is the most eloquent testimony of a crisis that is evident in every sphere: economic, political and social.

When the unfolding political crisis began in November 1992 with the cancellation of presidential election primaries and the postponement of elections until June 1993, I confidently predicted that continuation of military rule beyond January 1994 would not be tolerated by Nigerians.  I was confident that Babangida would disappear from the scene one way or the other.  I also knew that Sonekan’s first coming in the shape of a Transitional Council would not do any good for the country.  Finally, I was confident that the Sonekan-led Interim National Government would not last its six-month term.  All my predictions proved true except the apparent perpetuation of military rule. What really happened? How would it all unfold and, put more bluntly, what future for Nigeria?

What really happened? I would have to admit that as a temporary expatriate Nigerian, the facts that are available to me are limited.  On the basis of conversations with two intellectual giants [one from a southern state and the other from a northern state] between November 28th and December 2nd and with insights derived from three visits to Nigeria between January and October 1993, I would like to record the following:

(i) The forces mobilized to send Babangida packing on or before August 27th 1993

(his self-imposed final departure deadline), were too strong for him to resist successfully. In the end, he had to bow out in disgrace.  Babangida’s die-hard supporters among both the civilian and military elite groups were outnumbered ad the external environment was openly hostile.

(ii) The anti-Babangida coalition began to show cracks as soon as he disappeared

from the scene.  Position taken for or against Babangida-imposed Interim National Government (ING), led by the feckless Sonekan, separated the two factions that emerged within the civilian elite.  Although the ING was at the centre of the split, the polarization also took on the coloration of existing dichotomies: SPD/NRC, ethnic, linguistic, geopolitical and religious. However, because the June 12 electoral verdict had revealed Nigerians’ preparedness to de-emphasize these dichotomies (thereby affirming an unprecedented commitment to ONE Nigeria), supporters and opponents of ING were found across the barriers of these dichotomies.  There were, of course, some outstanding “solidarities”: the Yorubas of the South-west massively rejected ING as did the press and pro-democracy NGOs.  On the other hand, the majority of the Hausa-Fulani elite and a significant proportion of Ibo elite were pro-ING. Significantly, whatever disagreements were in the military were kept “en famille”.  But there were rumours that the military was also divided like the rest of the society but outsiders did not know the details.

(iii) ING’s collapse was heralded by its inability to mobilise society for new presidential and local government elections scheduled for February 19994 and its inability to proceed with the “probe” of the results of the June 1993 elections.  It was dealt a fatal blow when a Lagos High Court declared it illegal.  When the military leadership decided to “collect powers” in the looming vacuum, the civilian elite was not organised to pose a challenge.  Indeed, indecent scrambling for sharing power ensued, largely along inter- and intra-party lines but with due attention to the other dichotomies mentioned above.  The military moved swiftly to quash dissent within its own ranks while it proceeded with the easier task of applying the tested “divide and rule” formula in dealing with the civilian elite.  The civilians offered little or no resistance and the country was returned to military rule after 83 days of ING.  (A curious element in all this was the provision in the Decree establishing the ING on the designation of the most senior “Secretary” in the Government as the successor to the Head of State in the event of the latter’s resignation.  General Abacha who was the designated most senior Secretary in the ING sensed an opportune moment to ask the weak and fumbling ING head to resign and he obliged!)

Economic Basis of Political Behaviour: One powerful message that has emerged from the exercise of political power in Nigeria since the 1970s is that it constitutes an escape from poverty for those who directly exercise it and those who are their associates.  A few daring ones make it through direct looting of the national treasury; some through rent-seeking activities, and others through jobs provided by the state.  The over-concentration of economic power (notably oil revenues) at the federal level accounts for the intense struggle for the control of the presidency.  The mix-bag of civilians who are in Abacha’s cabinet comprise established rent-seekers, perpetual dependents on state offices and an assorted number of opportunists.  A handful of apparently competent and honest public servants in the “team” would have to prove that they are different.  As for the military leadership, General Abacha himself was a key participant in the institutionalisation of corruption during Babangida’s rule.  Military rule and institutionalised corruption undermined the economic policy reforms embarked upon in 1986 to the disadvantage of the Nigerian society: the deepening of poverty, decay of the educational system, crumbling infrastructure and virtually non-existent health services. If Abacha’s rule would mean more of the same (I cannot see how it would be different), then, what future for Nigeria?

Whither Nigeria? I had thought that a decision on whether a mismanaged Nigeria should be kept ONE at all costs should be postponed until 1998 or 1999.  Today, (December 3rd 1993), I am convinced that the issue should be resolved within the next 24 months.  Disintegration is an option that should be put on the table for free and frank discussion.  What is needed is a system of rule that would allow the harnessing of the country’s human and natural resources for the benefit of all its citizens.  That system of rule would not be military-led.  It should be a federal democracy with significantly reduced powers at the federal level together with other characteristics similar to those set out in the November 1991 issue of Publius, The Journal of Federalism devoted to “Federalism in Nigeria”.

– December 3rd 1993

Postscript: As a member of the Nigerian elite living abroad at this point in time, I feel hobbled, humbled and humiliated.