By John Amoda
GENERAL Abdusalami Abubakar, himself at a seminar on the same subject as the present one, spoke on this question of reversible and irreversible shift in the balance of power between the ruling factions, the Military and the Civilian. Quoting Graham Allison, the former Head of State said:

“Once some steps towards democracy are taken, it becomes much harder to reverse the process. To him, Nigeria as a nation is still taking those tentative steps in her political journey and whether or not the country would slide back or move forward would depend on all Nigerians, especially the political leadership.

In the 10-page address, General Abubakar examined the last 38 months of civilian administration, saying that there was the temptation to rush to the conclusion that the political actors have neither learnt from nor forgotten the negative anti-democratic and potentially destructive traits of the nation’s unpleasant political past.

Abubakar who in his address relished the fact that he ended the 16 years of continuous military rule in Nigeria said he believed that the military was now better and more professional confining itself to its sole constitutional role of defence and security within the nation’s borders.

But he said that the experience in the last 38 months did not inspire much confidence in the democratic future of the nation. He noted that the political leadership should guide the direction of the democratic quest. The followership bears an even, more fundamental burden because, according to him, “democracy is a limitation on the freedom of rulers that must be imposed by the ruled themselves”. He therefore urged Nigerians to rise up to the challenge of playing watchdog of the democratic process by consistently insisting that the political class lives up to its responsibility to the constitution and the people”. (The Guardian, Saturday, August 3, 2002 Pp1-2).

In the above, we read the remarks of General Abubakar on the prospects of civilian-championed democracy. His prognosis is that the future of democracy is problematic. He observes that the electoral parties do not seem to have learnt all that is needed from the past of civilian political behaviour. He juxtaposed 16 years of military rule to 38 months, that is three years and two months of civilian administration of the 1999 Constitution. We observe that he was silent on the effect of 16 years of military rule on the Military and on Project Nigeria itself. For without a Nigeria we cannot have a democratic Nigeria, or a constitutionally-governed Nigeria.

However, the more troublesome statements of General Abubakar are on the military and the followership. The military, says Abubakar, is no threat to democracy because it is “now better, more professional “and now confines itself to its sole constitutional role: on the followership devolves the responsibility of assuring democracy a future in Project Nigeria. These judgements do not illuminate the course of the Democratic Project in Nigeria. The Abubakar Transition Programme was like all Military Transition Programmes an elite affair. Succession to office and not the establishment or democracy was the object in view. The question of the type of civilian succession that would establish constitutional government irreversibly was not addressed and is not being made part of the present INEC democratic project in Nigeria.

Thus, we must ask, if the Abubakar Military Constitution can only be secured by civilian elite, who speaks not in the name of the Nigerian masses but in the names of their ethnic constituencies and zones(what with the cry for ethnic and zonal power shifts). How are the elites organising for the security of civilian constitutional government? And if the past foretells the future, it may very well be that what is not sustainable in Nigeria is elite constitutional government. Yet, if it is the emergence of elite civilian constitutional government that creates the “space” that legitimises demand for a Nigerian democracy, then it is of strategic importance to transcend the intra-elite discourse of Military and Civilian rivalry in an effort to address the issue of democracy for the mass. What we now have is an intra-elite project or constitutional restraint or domestication of the Armed Forces, to restrict them to their sole role of defence and security.

This intra-elite project falls under security sector reform projects. It is therefore reductionist to equate this factional state power succession negotiations with statecraft concerns of democracy for the majority. Since 1960 to the present, the concerns for democracy has been the project of democracy for the elite, the few. Today what may be sustainable is democracy for the majority, the many. This is in the context of Nigeria’s post- colonial and post-military rule must now be seen as an alternate project of democracy in Nigeria.