Talking Point

August 31, 2016

Nigerian militias and an economy in custoday

Nigerian militias and an economy in custoday

By Rotimi Fasan
Nigeria’s journey from fraternal hostility to national integration was on course (at least with no major or visible bumps) for nearly a quarter of a century after the civil war ended. But from the mid- 1990s onward the country entered a new and sustained phase of ethnic tension following a long period of military rule led by Nigerians from the North of the country.

In the wake of the failure of the Ibrahim Babangida transition programme, the annulment of the 1993 presidential election won by Moshood Abiola and the judicial murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the attempt to hold on to power by another set of military adventurers led by Sani Abacha   would result in a renewed phase of ethnic consciousness. Such consciousness this time would take a militant or militarised form. The military’s use of force would be challenged with force by sections of the civil society no longer ready to accept the domination of the county by sectional elements. After all, what the military had to sustain its self-imposed rule was its use and control of arms.

As the military, once a symbol of national integration, plunged further into ethnic politics and its leaders became spokespersons of sectional rule, so did its authority to speak in the name of the entire country weakened.CARTOON-MILI

Armed militias with the formidable backing of persons, groups and even countries tired of the arrogance of the military and its corrupt monopolisation of power, rose to provide opposition to military rule. Since these militias drew their support from the particular locations of their origin, they acted and spoke mostly in defense of the different ethnic groups from among which they emerged.

At different points in the history of the country, ever since, diverse groups of ethnically-motivated persons have emerged to question the authority of the central government in Abuja that is national in nothing but name. Thus, under Abacha, the Odua Peoples Congress provided an alternative view of how Nigeria should be governed. A few years before this Ken Saro-Wiwa had with the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People led the  Ogoni in a fight for environmental and social justice that would culminate in his murder by the Abacha dictatorship.

Both OPC and MOSOP would continue with their agitations well into the period of transition from military to civilian rule. But after Olusegun Obasanjo was recruited into the presidential race and he won the 1999 election to become president, he had to contend with MOSOP and more violent rival groups of militias from the Niger-Delta. With the Yoruba presumably placated with the victory of Obasanjo, leaders of the OPC looked from the sideline even as they continued to reap personal gains from their years of struggle against the military. But in the Niger Delta ethnic militias mushroomed. Members of these groups had been supported and armed by politicians out to seize power in the build-up to the 1999 elections.

After the elections the groups lost their political patronage but were left with heavy weaponry that had to be used one way or another, mostly for criminal purposes. It was from among these groups, that initially specialised in kidnapping foreign oil workers for ransom in the Niger Delta, that Asari Dokubo would rise into national prominence. He was certainly the first militant leader that gave more than a loud hint of what personal profit could be made from militancy. Dokubo rubbed shoulders with Obasanjo after the former failed in his attempt to cage him. In the end he was so sated with wealth that he gradually lost his bite as a soldier, leaving space for others to fill. He would later go into premature but opulent retirement. Dokubo’s successors would prove Umar Yar’Adua’s bugbear.

It was for their subalterns, veritable foot soldiers and cannon fodders that he would create the amnesty programme. It was the first attempt to ‘democratise’ the benefit of militancy, making it available to persons outside the close circle of militia leaders. But after Goodluck Jonathan became president, his opposition would come from ethnically-motivated politicians from the North. It was with the active support or connivance of these politicians that the Boko Haram group that had been subdued by the Obasanjo administration would begin to stage a comeback.

They, like the pre-1999 militants of the Niger Delta, would grow too fast and too big to control by those politicians who encouraged them by their silence, mild or active support. They grew very strong under a weak and corrupt Jonathan administration that was badgered by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, the only militia from that region to oppose Jonathan. It was after Jonathan lost the 2015 election, indeed a clear year after that historic defeat, that various militias speaking in the name of the Niger Delta, with the notable exception of MEND (still very much at war with Jonathan), would declare war on the Buhari administration.

Now the so-called Avengers which has broken into factions because of the usual reason of group and personal gains of its leaders is in ascendancy. It is several groups that go by one name. But it has so far sustained its threat of crippling the economy in the fashion of previous militias from different parts of the country.

Oil pipelines have been vandalised to a degree that has worsened the country’s parlous economy. In the present circumstance, the Nigerian economy is gasping for breath with the price of foodstuffs and household goods going beyond the reach of the people. Even though its economic woes are largely inherited, the Buhari administration has not shown itself to be fully apprised of what it takes to turn things around.

The worst criticism of the administration seems to be coalescing around its lack of economic know-how. The confident strides the government has taken in combating corruption is being threatened with the failure to effect economic turn-around. The danger here is that as things get testier for the administration it may totally give up on what is surely its relative advantage over the Goodluck Jonathan administration- the fight against corruption.

While the full picture of the benefits of the anti-corruption war is yet to emerge, there is every possibility that the process might be compromised and its potential gains derailed.

What is more, the government might in desperation unleash lethal force on the self-aggrandising militias of the Niger Delta as it has been threatening to. This would turn out a fulfillment of the prophecy of opponents of Buhari who see him very much in the skin and clothing of the dictator he once was. President Muhammadu Buhari would therefore be well-advised to take urgent steps to roll out plans to bring immediate relief to Nigerians from the economic pain of the moment even as he tackles other pressing issues of insecurity.