A transformation agenda for accelerating national development
By Ladipo Adamolekun
Introduction
THE “Transformation Agenda” that I present in this Lecture comprises five “Fundamentals”, three “Transformation Result Areas” (TRAs) and some implementation issues. In Part One, I briefly discuss the five selected fundamentals: electoral legitimacy, peace and security, government policy stability, rule of law, and anti-corruption. Part Two is focused on the three TRAs: (i) rehabilitating education; (ii) fixing poor infrastructure; and (iii) achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They are briefly presented with emphasis on some specific actions that could ensure concrete results within the president’s four-year tenure.
I also provide justification for the viewpoint that the TRAs should feature prominently among the priorities of President Jonathan’s administration. In Part Three, I discuss four implementation issues: (i) the centrality of the Civil Service; (ii) intergovernmental dimensions; (iii) the role of non-state actors (NSAs); and (iv) the critical importance of monitoring and evaluation. I make the point that rapid and sustained attention to building implementation capability for, and around, the four issues is critical to achieving concrete results in respect of the TRAs. As a concluding observation, I wonder aloud whether, by 2015, the scorecard of President Jonathan would deservedly earn him the title of a transformational leader, that is, a leader who has assured good progress in the implementation of a transformation agenda.
I would like to stress that I do not claim any definitiveness for the fundamentals, TRAs, and implementation issues addressed in this Lecture. The decision to focus on them is influenced, partly by what I have learned and observed in Nigeria over four decades (from the 1960s to the present), and partly by the African and international experiences to which I have been exposed over the years as an academic, and as a development professional in the World Bank where I was engaged for about two decades (late 1980s to early 2000s) in activities aimed at helping countries achieve good development performance. Consequently, comparative perspectives are provided in different parts of the Lecture, drawing on the experiences of countries in Africa, other developing countries as well as developed countries, as appropriate.
FIVE FUNDAMENTALS
1. Electoral Legitimacy
The significance of electoral legitimacy is that the government that emerges through free, fair and credible elections is expected to be accountable to the citizens that have entrusted the exercise of political authority to it. In turn, the citizens who, through their votes, have determined who governs them (this includes using their votes to remove non-performing governments) are also expected to demand accountability from their rulers.
The combination of rulers who are accountable to their citizens and citizens that demand accountability from their rulers is generally considered conducive for achieving well-performing governments
It is widely acknowledged by Nigeria’s opinion leaders as well as by outside observers that getting electoral legitimacy right has been a challenge for the country since 1999. All the elections conducted in 1999, 2003 and 2007 lacked credibility, with the “do or die” 2007 elections as the worst of them. In other words, the rulers did not consider themselves obliged to observe the norm of being accountable to the citizens and the citizens whose votes did not count, did not bother to demand accountability.
In 2010, President Jonathan assured Nigerians as well as Nigeria’s external friends that he will break the jinx of flawed elections in the country. He has delivered on his promise, to an appreciable extent. Notwithstanding the fact that Nigeria’s transformation toward an electoral democracy is an unfinished agenda (the honest, focused and committed chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission, INEC – has himself admitted that there are still some flaws to correct in the electoral process), one can confidently assert that when president Jonathan is inaugurated on May 29th, he would assure Nigerians that consistent with
(see Diagram 1).
the electoral legitimacy conferred on him through the citizens’ votes, he would be accountable to them during his tenure. And if the citizens, for their part, determine that they will continuously demand accountability from him, the country will be in the fortunate position of having one of the key ingredients for accelerating national development between 2011 and 2015. African countries that have been in this fortunate position ahead of Nigeria include Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, and South Africa. Further afield, Brazil and India are notable examples.
2. Peace and Security
Assuring peace and security within the territorial area of a state is an incontrovertible precondition for development and it is also the case that there can be no peace without development. In the Nigerian context, the oil-rich Niger Delta is the supreme illustration of these two assertions. Without peace and security in the Niger Delta, oil and gas that contributes about 32 percent of the country’s GDP and about 80 percent of government revenues will be at risk. And without development in the area, that is, serious implementation of projects and programmes for reducing poverty and introduction and implementation of socio-economic activities that can help move the citizens in the area towards prosperity, sustainable peace and security cannot be achieved. The on-going implementation of the Niger Delta Amnesty programme, introduced by the Yar’Adua administration is a step in the right direction. However, there is need to revisit the implementation arrangements for managing both the Amnesty Programme and promoting development in the Niger-Delta. Specifically, I would argue that the Ministry of Niger Delta created in 2008 significantly duplicates the work of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and it should be folded into the NDDC. What is required is the strengthening of the NDDC and ensuring that competent and top flight experts and professionals are recruited with appropriate remunerations to turn the Commission into a well-performing organisation.
The other dimension to the challenge of peace and security in Nigeria is the threat posed by a combination of ethnic-religious conflicts and inter- and intra-elite struggles for political power and the vast opportunities for accumulating wealth through unearned generous salaries and mind-boggling renting-seeking activities. While political power struggle was a factor in the post-election violence in Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano and Niger, religious fanaticism is the chief explanatory factor for the violence unleashed by Boko Haram since the late 2000s. (Boko Haram literally means Western and/or non-Islamic education is a sin). And in Jos, the combination of all three factors – ethnic, religious and political power struggles – account for the unending killings in the once-peaceful and serene city.
Failure to implement the recommendations of the succession of commissions of inquiry set up to probe the politico-ethnic-religious conflicts in Jos since the early 2000s has undermined the usefulness of this instrument for tackling the problem. This record of failed commissions of inquiry also extends to the probes of Boko Haram’s incessant riots and killings. Given this evidence, it is doubtful if the judicial commission recently set up to probe post-election violence will prove different. Unfortunately, successive governments have not succeeded in respect of the preventive alternative, that is, reliance on security forces that help to maintain peace and security . And governments’ capacity for conflict prevention and management is patently weak. In these circumstances, tackling the root causes of the politico-ethnic-religious conflicts in the country appears to be the most viable route to finding lasting solutions. Is there a role here for the Sovereign National Conference that some opinion leaders have advocated since the early 1990s? This is a challenge that the president needs to address as a priority.
3. Government Policy Stability
It would be correct to assert that stability in economic policy, especially macro-economic stability, during the 2000s reinforced by the clarity and consistency in broad economic and social policies since the launch and implementation of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), is a major explanation for the strong economic growth recorded by the country since 2001 (see Table 1). Barring any major reversals, decent GDP growth rate is projected for 2011-2015. However, at the level of specific economic and social policy actions there have been varying degrees of inconsistencies and contradictions, including notable policy reversals. The following are three examples of policy reversals between June 2007 and June 2008: one in the economic sector (specifically, privatisation policy) and two in the education sector.
Notes: (1) The African “Lions” listed are among the top ten in the world for each period covered.
(2)Countries with less than 10m population are excluded.
Privatisation: Although privatisation is one of the main planks of the economic policy reforms in NEEDS, the Yar’Adua administration cancelled some of the privatisation transactions carried out between 2004 and 2007 including: Kaduna and Port Harcourt refineries, sale of SAT 3, take-over of NICON Insurance and sale of NITEL to TRANSCORP and some concession agreements. Considering the reported gains from the 100 or so privatisations that took place between 1999 and 2007 (the telecommunication sector yielded the most visible gains), the policy reversals send wrong signals to both domestic and foreign investors. The alternative to ad hoc policy reversals could have been a comprehensive review of government’s privatisation policy with a view to making it work better for Nigerians through, among other measures, greater attention to transparency and the strengthening of regulatory administration and enforcement capacity to ensure fair competition and protection for consumers. This is a task that is yet to be tackled.
Education Sector: Two inherited policies in the education sector that were reversed
are: (i) public-private-partnership (PPP) arrangement in the management of 102 Federal Government Colleges (unity schools) and (ii) merger of polytechnics and colleges of education with universities. The main explanation given for reversing the inherited PPP arrangement is because the schools are still useful for promoting national integration and should, therefore, continue to be run by the Federal Government.
However the government was silent on the implicit breach of the contract between it and the emerging Schools Management Organisations. Furthermore, the assertion on the usefulness of the unity schools for promoting national integration was not based on any opinion survey involving the key stakeholders.
Regarding the reversal of the inherited policy on the merger of polytechnics and colleges of education with universities, the consultation and dialogue with the public promised by the new administration had not been embarked upon when it decided to push for polytechnics in the country to award bachelor’s degree in technology instead of being affiliated with universities. Significantly, no analytic work was conducted on the pre-requisites for ensuring that the proposed bachelor of technology degrees will be of good quality and be relevant to the needs of employers.
It is reasonable to assume that the decent growth rate achieved between 2001 and 2010 and projected for 2011-2015 will convince president Jonathan to continue to maintain macro-economic stability during his tenure. Regarding other socio-economic policies (for example, privatization policy and social policies focused on education and health), abrupt policy reversals should be avoided whilst necessary policy adjustments should be carried out only after adequate analytic work and consultations with key stakeholders. Evidence that policy stability matters is provided by the experiences of the majority of the thirteen countries world-wide that recorded sustained high growth (7 percent and above) for 25 years or longer during the second half of the 20th century.
Continues tommorow….
Being text of a an inaugural lecture delivered by Professor Ladipo Adamolekun at an event organised by the Office of the Head of the Civil Servi ce of the Federation.
